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Decision-making ability In well defined situations has been the
subject of much study In recent years, but little attention has been

paid to decisiveness as a general characteristic of Individuals which

may relate to other areas of psychological ftinctlonlng.

The present

Investigation attempts to examine the nature of decisiveness and its
relationship to a number of areas of psychological adjustment.
Six dimensions of decisiveness are defined, each tapping a particular aspect of the decision-making process.

These include four

behavioral dimensions which are based on performance in various deftiiion-

making sitxiations (need for information, confidence in decisions, risk
taking, and tendency to defer decisions), and two global, impressionistic

dimensions, a self-appraisal of decisiveness and a peer rating of decisiveness.

Instruments tapping each of these dimensions were ad-

of
ministered to a large number of undergraduates, along with a variety

subjective and objective measures of psychological adjustment.

It was

measures
postulated that subjects who score high on the decisiveness
indicating a
will also score high on the adjustment measures, thus

relationship between decisiveness and adjustment.
measures except
Besults supported the test validity of all of the
evidence of multidlmensionality.
for Tendency to Defer Decisions, which showed

V

The pattern of relationships between the decisiveness measures suggested
that decisiveness itself is not a single, global characteristic of

individuals, but rather contains a number of relatively independent

aspects which do show some relationship to each other.

The biggest

distinction is between the behavioral and the impressionistic dimensions of decisiveness.

The pattern of relationships between the decisiveness and adjust-

ment measures indicated that the impressionistic measures of decisiveness related more strongly to adjustment than did the behavioral measures
of decisiveness.

While these data were shown to be contaminated by

methods factors, the observed correlation between the self and peer
ratings, coupled with the fact that these two measures of decisiveness

related to the adjustment measures in very similar ways, suggest that
the entire relationship between the self-appraisals of decisiveness

and adjustment is not a function of response bias.

In addition to this

major finding, it was observed that the behavioral measures of decisivethat
ness tend to relate to behavioral indicators of adjustment, and

adjustment,
sex is a factor in the interaction between decisiveness and
adjustment, and
with decisive females reporting higher self ratings of

decisive males receiving higher peer ratings of adjustment.

Other,

conclusions are dismore specific conclusions are presented, and all

experiential link
cussed from the perspective of a theoretical and

between decisiveness and adjustment.
existence of a relationWhile this research clearly supports the
adjustment, further research
ship between decisiveness and psychological

employing a more refined methodology, a more heterogeneous subject
population, and decision-making situations which more closely approxi-

mate real-life situations Is indicated.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter

P^g,
.

I

Introduction

....

......

1

Theoretical Background
The Nature of Decisiveness

16

Adjustment and Performance Measures

23

Hypothesis
II

4

.

.

..•«....

».

Method

26

Sxibjects

26

.....

Measures and Procedures
III

24

27

Results

34

Test Validity of the Measures

34

Relationship between Decisiveness
and Adjtistment Measures

47

Methods Variance

53
s

s-

Additional Analyses

IV

...............

67

•

77

.....

77

•

81

•

51

Discussion

•

The Nature of Decisiveness

........

The Relationship of Decisiveness to
Psychological Adjustment

V

Summary and Conclusions

•

...........

94

References

Appendix

.

'

•

•

vlll

LIST OF TABLES

Table

1

2

3

Page

Inter-item and Item-total Correlation
Matrices for Each Adjixstment Measure

,37

Factor Loadings for Items on Tendency
to Defer Decisions and Percent of Variance
Accotmted for by Each Factor

,41

Correlation Matrix of Relationship
Between Decisiveness Measures

......

44

Significant T-values for All Adjustment
Measures

49

Multitrait-multimethod Correlation Matrix
For Self and Peer Eatings

56

Multitrait-multimethods Correlation Matrix
for "Information Processing" and Confidence
in Decisions

60

7

Summary of Multiple Regression Data

63

8

Summary of Factor Analysis of All
Decisiveness Measures

68

4

5

6

1

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

"Man becomes truly human only at the moment of decision."
Paul Tillich

The ability to make decisions is a vital characteristic of being

human which has been emphasized by philosophers and religious leaders
for centuries.

Most recently, the so-called "existentialists,"

coming from both religious and secular traditions, have noted the
crucial importance of man's capacity to choose his own values, roles,
and meaning in life, as evidenced in a theme repeated throughout the

work of Sartre, "I am my choices."
of

modem psychology,

William James, in the early days

stated that "there is no more miserable human

being than one in whom nothing is habitual but indecision" (1893)
and contemporary observers of

modem man such

as Toffler (1970) have

pointed out the adverse consequences of a society which places an
ever increasing demand on the individual to make more decisions than
he can handle.

Indeed, it is in the experience of making decisions

that the individual most fully experiences his own capabilities and

potential for growth, and the ability to make decisions is one of the

most important factors in the way one reacts to and copes with stress.
It is the intention of this research to examine the link between one's

ability to make decisions and his ability to cope with stress and

satisfactorily meet the demands of life in

modem

society.

It is important to specify at the outset of this research the

major theme which distinguishes it from previous work on decision-making.
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A considerable body of literature exists on decision-making, but by
far the major portion of this literature Is devoted to either under-

standing the various factors which affect the decision-making process,
or to developing models, usually mathematical, which shed light on the

decision-making process.

Thus, one sees many comprehensive studies

on the effect of such variables as personality traits, skill versus
chance conditions, amount of payoff, values, or prior training on

decision-making.

Similarly, there are complicated mathematical analogues

of the decision-making process which explore optimal decision-making

strategies, expected gains set against objective costs, and input-

output equations.

Now, all of these studies are important and useful,

and in fact many of them will be cited later in our attempt to develop
an effective methodology for the present research.

Our major interest,

however, lies not in specifying elements of the decision-making process
or even the extent to which the ability to engage in the process is

affected by personality or other variables.

Rather, we are interested

in exploring the consequences which follow from the existence of certain

patterns or styles of decision-making in an individual.

we are posing the following question:

Most generally,

"Is there a relationship between

and
an individual's ability to engage in the decision-making process

his ability to cope with life and its stresses?"

More specifically,

prior to
does the person who requires a great amount of information
than an
reaching a decision experience greater anxiety under stress
deal of
individual who is able to make a decision without a great

Information?

in making
Is the individual who experiences difficulty

academic tasks?
a decision more likely to fall in social or

This is
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the type of question this research will attempt to answer.
Of course, this is not to say that factors which are responsible

for the development of decision-making styles are not important.

The

theoretical persepctives which form the basis of this research strongly

emphasize the determinants of decision-making behavior, and it would
be foolish to pretend that perfectly stable decision-making styles
arise out of a vacuum.

Indded, it can be argued that the "arbitrary"

consideration of the decision-making styles of the individual apart
from his personal history, situational variables, and personality factors

which affect decision-making would result in a simplistic or even invalid study.

On the other hand, the same argument can be used against

considering any human phenomenon as a distinct object of inquiry.

For

example, the personality factors which are taken to be responsible for

decision-making behavior are themselves a result of many variables.
Another important point is that the utility of considering "second order"

phenomena apart from causative data has been demonstrated in many areas.
Thus, one can make predictions about the adjustment of homosexuals in

our society without dealing explicitly with the factors behind homo-

sexuality, and the behaviorists have based their entire discipline on
the premise that observable behavior is more important than unobservable

"causes" of behavior.

Thus, we are considering decision-making as a

behavior which indeed is a result of many determinants, but which in
and of itself can shed light on a variety of clinical variables, including reactions to stress, satisfaction with life situations, etc.

Having prefaced this discussion with a delineation of the problem
this
under consideration and a specification of the differences between

research and related work, it is necessary to consider briefly the
theoretical justification for our assumption that decision-making plays
an important role in psychological adjustment.

Two additional points

of clarification are in order at this point, however.

First, our em-

phasis throughout this research will be on the phenomenological

,

or

experiential aspects of decision-making, although an assessment of the
"objective" elements of the process which are generally inaccessible
to the awareness of the individual will also be made in order to broaden

our insight into the decision-making process.

The reason for this

emphasis will become clear in our discussion of the theoretical background of this research.

Second, as a function of this emphasis, we

will use the term "decisiveness" throughout, by which we mean the
ability of the individual to engage in the decision-making process.

We will not be concerned with the objective accuracy of decisions, the
extent to which decision-making strategies approximate optimal strategies
etc.

Again, the reason for this will become clear as we proceed.

Theoretical Background

The importance of decision-making in relation to both pathological
and normal adjustment is implicit in much of the literature of social

and clinical psychology.

We will be concentrating on four perspectives

which relate to decision-making, which, when taken together, constitute
of
a strong argument for considering decisiveness as a major aspect

psychological adjustment.
Competence .

competence theory.

The first of these perspectives is Robert W. White's

According to White, the urge towards competence is
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fundamental to the development of the cognitive structure by means of

which we understand the world and ourselves.

He summarizes his theory

as follows:

The thesis of this essay is that the objective
stable world is a construction based upon action.
The knowledge that we gain of the environment is
a knowledge of potentialities for action, of what
one surely can do, probably can do, may be able to
do, probably cannot do, and surely cannot do with
objects and situations that arise.... It is a system
of readiness for action, and it seems to me quite
proper to conceive of it as patterns of facilitation
and inhibition in the central nervous system. Reality
leaves its record, then, in the form of action possibilities learned through action and its consequences
(White, 1963, p. 69).

This emphasis on action is based on the observation that many

behaviors seem to be motivated not only to gratify biological needs
or to avoid unpleasant states, but also to simply experience the

effects of one's actions on the world.

Such an experience leads to

what White refers to as the "joy in being a cause."

To the degree

that the individual is successful in his attempts to affect the

world, he develops a feeling of efficacy, and the cumulative exper-

iences of efficacy result in a sense of competence.

An important

corollary of this is the observation that initiating future actions
is contingent on having experienced successful past actions.

Thtis,

the individual who has developed a sense of competence through past

successful actions is more likely to take future actions, while an

individual who has not had such experiences becomes reluctant to engage in actions.

This point has strong implications for such clinical

variables as level of aspiration, motivation, reactions to stress, and
self-esteem.

As White states it:
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Self-esteem. .has its taproot in the experience of
efficacy.
It is not built merely on what others do
or what the environment provides.
From the very
start it is based on what one can make the environment provide, even if it is only through more vigorous sucking or more loudly sustained cries....
Understanding self-esteem means understanding the
history of action and its consequences (White, 1963,
.

p.

134)..

In competence theory, then, we see an emphasis on the individual's

perception of his ability to take action as basic to the development
of a sense of competence, self-esteem, and other clinical phenomena.

This theme is consistent with the work of Seligman (1973)

depression as "a belief in one's own helplessness"

(p.

,

who defines

44) and who

states that "a cure for depression occurs when the individual comes
to believe that he is not helpless and that an individual's sus-

ceptibility to depression depends on the success or failure of his

previous experience with controlling the environment"

(p.

43).

Given this theoretical formulation, it is easy to see how decisiveness emerges as a basic aspect of psychological adjustment.

White is

saying that one must act In order to experience efficacy, an essential
aspect of the development of a sense of competence and self-esteem.
Further, on the basis of repeated past experiences of successful action

on the environment the individual develops a sense of readiness for
future action, for he is confident of his ability to bring about the

desired effect.

In the present formulation decisiveness is taken to

be the most important manifestation of the ability to take action.
That is, most of the actions which the individual is called upon to

perform involve making decisions on a conscious level.

If the individual

Is ready to take action, one can also say that he is able to make
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decisions, for the subjective component of readiness for action is con-

tained in the experience of reaching decisions when confronted with new
or stressful situations.

Finally, the individual who feels competent

to handle these decisions, that is, who is ready to take action as mani-

fested by his decisiveness, is better able to cope with the situation
on an objective level, and subjectively will experience less anxiety,

will be less prone to the feeling of helplessness associated with depression^; etc.

It is interesting to note that the above argument does,

in fact, take the antecedents of decisiveness into consideration, namely,

repeated past experiences of effecting successful action upon the environment, but we are also saying that after a period of time patterns of

decision-making begin to evolve into a semiautonomous behavior which,
although still potentially affected by many determinants, exerts a
strong influence on the individual's reaction to stress.
Ix)cus of control .

Another position which relates to decisiveness

is Rotter's Locus of Control Construct, or the "internal-external"

dimension.

"Internals" are those individuals who believe that they

possess a measure of control over their life, while "externals" place
the locus of control in outside forces.

According to our view that

the perceived ability to control the environment is an important factor

in the development of a sense of competence and self-esteem, we should

expect that the literature and research on locus of control would Indicate
that internals would report higher self-esteem and better coping patterns

than externals.

In fact, this is precisely what the literature indicates.

Epstein and Komorita (1970) found that their high-self-esteem subjects
tended to be more internal than their low-self-esteem subjects, and that
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failure in an experimental task was attributed to external factors,

while successes were attributed to internal factors.
consistent with those of Fitch (1970)
loctts

,

These data are

who found that subjects employ

of control for purposes of self-enhancement, attributing successes

to internal factors and failures to external factors, and with Hiroto's

conclusions "that externals were more susceptible to learned helplessness
than internals" (Seligman, 1973, p. 45).

These data are summarized in

a recent review of the literature on locus of control, in which Joe
(1971) concludes that

...externals describe themselves as anxious, less
able to show constructive responses in overcoming
frustration, and are more concerned with fear of
failure than with achievement per se. Internals,
on the other hand, describe themselves as more concerned with achievement, more constructive in overcoming frustration, and less anxious (pp. 625-626).
Thus, it is clear that internals tend to cope better, experience

less anxiety, and have higher self-esteem than externals.

If we look

carefully at a more precise definition of the I-E dimension, the relationship of this theoretical construct to our notion of decisiveness

becomes clear.

In what is perhaps the most extensive review of the

locus of control literature, Lef court (1966) offers the following

definition:
As a general principle, internal control refers to
the perception of positive and/or negative events
as being a consequence of one's own actions and
thereby under personal control; external control
refers to the perception of positive and/or negative
events as being unrelated to one's behaviors in
certain situations and therefore beyond personal
control (p. 207).
In this definition we see the link between "personal control" and
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events being "a consequence of one's own actions."

This, of course,

is quite similar to the position stated in competence theory,
in which

beliefs about the effectiveness of one's own actions are linked to a
sense of competence, self-esteem, and other coping behaviors.

In both

cases, the role of decision-making ability or decisiveness is the same:

one shows his confidence in his ability to take action by the way he
makes decisions.

If someone cannot arrive at a decision, this indicates

a problem in taking action, which according to both competence theory

and some of the research on locus of control leads to low self-esteem,

poor coping, and so on.

Despite the obvious similarity between the two

positions, however, it is useful to point out a subtle difference,
as this will serve to clarify the relationship of decisiveness to both

of these positions.

Competence theory focuses on the feeling one gets

as a function of taking action.

Locus of control focuses on one's beliefs

about one's ability to take action.

both of these elements.

Our notion of decisiveness contains

It is concerned with the process of taking

action in response to various situations, and as such has both a sub-

jective component based upon feelings related to taking action and a
cognitive component based upon one's beliefs about the probable consequences of one's actions.
Cognitive dissonance .

A third perspective which bears upon our

interest in decisiveness as a determinant of how individuals cope with

stressful situations is Festinger's (1957) well known dissonance theory.
The essential elements of dissonance theory can be sunmiarized for our

purposes as follows:

cognitive dissonance is "a state of psychological

discomfort or tension which motivates efforts to achieve consonance"
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(Brown, 1965, p. 584), this state being caused by the simultaneous

aff inaation of two or more mutually exclusive cognitive elements or

beliefs.

Thus, if an individual believes both Statement A and Statement B,

but Statement A Implies the negation of Statement B, then a state of
cognitive dissonance is said to occur, resulting in psychological discomfort and a strong motivation to achieve consonance.

As pointed out

by Brehm and Cohen (1962) in their comprehensive review of empirical
studies based on dissonance theory, most often dissonance involves an

Inconsistency between action on the one hand and a belief on the other
Thus, a person may believe that smoking is harmful to health,

hand.

but may be unable to stop smoking.

They also point out that the comml t-

ment to action is the stronger of the two elements, in that an individual
is more likely to alter a belief in order to reduce dissonance than he
is to alter commitment to action.

This point is supported by many

studies (for example, Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959; Aronson and Mills,
1959).

Thus, given a state of dissonance resulting from a conflict be-

tween an action and a belief, once the action is taken it becomes easier
to reduce dissonance by altering beliefs than it would be if the indi-

vidual cotild not commit himself to action, thereby remaining in a state
of "limbo."
It follows from this that an individual who is able to take posi-

tive action in the face of a dissonance producing situation will be able
to reduce his cognitive dissonance and thereby the level of anxiety in

the situation.

An individual who has difficulty taking such action will

tend to have a more difficult time reducing dissonance.

Given Pestingfcr^s

emphasis on the cognitive aspects of this process, it follows that one's
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perception of his ability to make decisions would bear upon one's
ability to reduce dissonance and Its affective correlate, anxiety.

In

other words, given a situation which results In cognitive dissonance,
a decisive Individual who Is able to reduce dissonance by making a

decision which leads to action will experience less anxiety than an
Indecisive Individual who Is unable to take such action because of his

Inability to reach a decision.

Anxiety .

A final perspective which Is related to this notion of

reducing dissonance by taking positive action Is contained In a paper

by Epstein (1970).

Actually, this paper surveys and then Integrates

several different viewpoints of anxiety and arrives at a position

which views anxiety as an unpleasant state of diffuse arousal stemming
from three basic sources:

primary overstimulation, cognitive incon-

gruity, and response unavailability.

These three sources of anxiety

are further specified and refined by Epstein in his discussion of the

distinction between fear and anxiety:
All (examples of anxiety producing situations have) one
thing in common, an inability to channel the arousal
produced by the threat into directed action .... It appears that to the extent that there is commitment to a
specific avoidance reaction, there is fear, and to the
extent there is indecision, or unavailability of direct
action, there is anxiety, and that there can be various
proportions of fear and anxiety in different situations
....Anxiety is viewed as a state in which the individual
experiences diffuse aroxisal, but is unable to direct
that arousal into purposive action for any of a variety
of reasons, including repression, failure in discrimrinatlon, a waiting period between the perception of
threat and possible action, indecision, conflict between
opposing response tendencies, and external restraint
(p.

17).

Related to this view of anxiety as a function of an inability to
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effect a directed response is the notion of expectancy, for
a stressful situation which Is expected Is much more amenable to a
directed

response than an unexpected one.

Thus, when the Individual feels able

to take directed action In a stressful situation with known
parameters,

he experiences less anxiety than In a situation In which such action Is

Impossible because of unknown parameters.

As we shall soon see, one

element of decisiveness Is the ability or willingness to define ambiguous
situations, so the decisive Individual Is better able to reduce the un-

certainty and concomitant anxiety of ambiguous situations.

The Implications of Epstein's view of anxiety are far reaching,
and It Is beyond the scope of this research to go Into the Intricacies
of his comprehensive and Involved paper.

However, we can quote a

particularly useful passage which brings his perspective into focus
for our purposes:
In sum, because of the nature of their anxiety system,
human beings are intrinsically motivated to structure
their world and to find ways of dealing with it
through action. At relatively low levels of anxiety,
the process is a constructive one, leading to expanded
awareness of reality and increasing control over nature.
At relatively high levies of anxiety, it is apt to produce retrenchment, including delusional Interpretations
of events (any explanation is better than none) , and
compulsive rituals for dealing with them (any action
is better than none) (p. 19).

The emphasis on action is clear, and we can conclude that the individual

who is able to effect action responses to stressful situations will
cope better.

Our position, once again, is that the most

iiiq)ortant

observable manifestation of the ability to take action is the decision-

making process, for the individual who is able to reach decisions has
accomplished the most important step in the sequence of events which
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leads to directed action.
Summary.

We are now in a position to integrate the major points

in the four theoretical positions surveyed, and thus more carefully

formulate our view of the importance of decisiveness and the specific
components of decisiveness.

Competence theory argues that the exper-

ience of successfully acting on the environment leads to a sense of

competence which both helps the individual to cope with stress and
increases his tendency to take future actions.

Rotter's theory is con-

sistent with this, foctising on the importance of one's beliefs in his

ability to affect the environment.

Dissonance theory specifies the

cognitive process by means of which concrete action can reduce dissonance
and anxiety.

Finally, we have Epstein's emphasis on the ability to

effect a directed response and to reduce xincertainty through action as
important factors in the handling of anxiety.

In each of these theo-

retical perspectives emphasis is placed on the ability of the individual
to take action, with a special emphasis on the cognitive component of
the process of effecting action.

Thus, the cognitive component is

viewed as basic to the development of a siense of competence, beliefs
about one's ability to exetcise personal control over one's life, the

experien^e^f dissonance, and a basic motivation to structure the world
in order to find ways of dealing with it through action.

The dominant,

recurrent theme is that anxiety, depression, low self-esteem, and poor

coping with stress are rooted in the individual's feeling or belief
that he cannot act, that he is helpless, that he does not know what to
do, that he is incompetent to do anything.

Given this theoretical convergence on the ability to take action.

1^

the present investigation concerns the behavior which is fundamental
to the ability to act, namely, the disposition to make decisions.

It

is in the experience of reaching a decision that the individual en-

counters the commitment to action and the feeling of efficacy described
above.

This point, of course, speaks to our reasons for emphasizing

the phenomenological aspects of decisiveness, for it is one's own view
of his ability to take action \diich leads to feelings of competence,

reduction of dissonance, and so on.

This is not to say that social

reinforcement and other external rewards do not add to the feeling of
competence.

In fact, social reinforcement can be considered as the

consequence of one's action in the same way as altering the physical

situation^ so one is still talking about the individual's perception
of his ability to effect some desired result.

In addition, social

reinforcement is usually directed at the individual's having taken a
good action, not at the action itself.

Again, it is the experience of

taking action which leads to praise and the desired result, and decision-

making is a crucial element of taking action.
The above discussion is not intended to imply that decision-making
and action are equivalent phenomena, for action can exist without a

conscious decision to act, and many decisions may involve no observable
"action."

However, in such cases (for example, reflexive action or acts

which are so habitual as to occur without conscious decisions) there
is usuedly not an important psychological component which leads to

anxiety, depression, etc.

On the other hand, virtually all situations

which can lead to anxiety or other adverse states involve a demand for
conscious action in the form of first making a decision.

Thus, an
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xmderstanding of how an individual handles decisions should afford
information about his readiness to act in stressful situations, and
hence speak to the individual's competence, self-esteem, and level of
anxiety.
In addition to the above theoretical rationale for singling out

decisiveness, there are some practical considerations.

First, people

are usually quite aware of their ability to handle decisions.

As such,

it makes sense to assume that a self-awareness of this process wotild

contribute to how one copes with situations which require decisions
the person who knows that he has trouble with decisions is likely to

experience anxiety when decisions are called for.

In addition, the

individual's ready access to his decision-making ability renders an

assessment of decisiveness relatively easy, for one may use self-report
data.

Finally, demonstrating that differences in decisiveness correlate

with differences in coping behavior raises the possibility of clinical
intervention in both assessment and treatment of maladaptive coping.
This is not to imply a necessary causal relationship between indecisive-

ness and poor coping, but rather a descriptive relationship, which woiild
still lend itself to clinical intervention.

This is based on the ob-

servation that many theories in psychology indicate the efficacy of
"treating" any one of a number of aspects of a problem, whether the
aspect under consideration is a "sj^tom" or a "cause."

A good example

of this is the behavioral approach, in which the "symptom" is the focus
of treattnent.

In our case, given a phenomenological similarity between

indecisiveness and, say, anxiety under pressure, one may perhaps alleviate

anxiety in response to this pressure by dealing directly with the anxiety
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or by dealing with the feeling of helplessness (indecisiveness)
which
is phenomenologically related to the anxiety.

That it is in fact

possible to alter decisiveness even under the constraints of short-term
counseling has been demonstrated by Ryan and Krumbolts (1964)

.

Indeed,

this may be an easier process than trying to alter feelings of competence,

self-esteem, or specific symptoms such as anxiety or depression.

The Nature of Decisiveness

The above theoretical argument leads us to believe that decisive-

ness is an important factor in the individual's ability to cope with
life and its stresses.

We have not explicitly considered the parameters

of decisiveness, nor have we considered the particular patterns of ad-

justment which correlate with decisiveness.

Let us proceed to explore

these questions, and then generate a specific hypothesis and a method-

ology to test it.
In the previous pages we were able to conclude that it is the ex-

periential or phenomenological aspect of decisiveness which is of special
interest.

The more objective, theoretical aspects of decisiveness, such

as optimal decision-making strategies, effect of payoff, and the like,
are usually less accessible to the awareness of the individual and are

inseparable from such factors as intelligence, ability to generate and

discriminate between alternative solutions, cognitive complexity, and
motivation, all of which are not necessarily related to the individual's

assessment of his ability to make decisions.
What, then, are observable and measurable experiential aspects of

decisiveness?

While most of the literature on decision-making deals
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with those mathematical or theoretical views of declslon-maklag
which
are not of direct Interest to us, It Is still possible to extract from
this literature a good sense of what we mean by decisiveness.

For ex-

ample, one's confidence In his ability to make decisions Is certainly

an important part of the experience of making decisions.

Hammer and

Rlngel (1965) studied confidence in decision-making and concluded "that

lack of confidence in their ability to make accurate decisions may cause
even those who could make accurate decisions on limited amounts of in-

formation to delay taking action"
ness alluded to above is need

(p.

519).

Another aspect of decisive-

for information.

Pruitt (1957) found

a positive correlation between the level of manifest anxiety and the

amount of information required in a decision-making task.

In both of

these studies, then, Important "adjustment responses" (ability to take

action and manifest anxiety) were seen to relate to need for information
and confidence in decisions.

As we shall soon see, these two aspects

of decisiveness will emerge as Important measures of decisiveness In

this research.

Another Important aspect of decisiveness is the extent to which
the individual is willing to tolerate or choose "risky" alternatives
as opposed to conservative or safe courses of action.

While this aspect

is probably not as central to decisiveness as need for information and

confidence in decisions, it does reflect an implicit attitude held

by the individual related to his competence as a decision-maker.

If

he feels he can make the "right" decision, then he would be more likely
to opt for risky alternatives.

Jellison and Risklnd (1970)

,

This position is strongly supported in

which examines a

grefit

deal of literature
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on risk taking and concludes that there is a close relationship between

risk taking and perceived ability.

A good discussion of this risky-

conservative dimension is found in Kogan and Wallach (1964)

,

and their

work forms the basis of one of our measures of decisiveness.
There are other aspects of decisiveness which are of interest to
us.

For example, Ivan Steiner and his research associates at the Univer-

sity of Massachusetts have recently initiated a line of investigation

involving one's tendency to defer decisions to others.

This dimension

seems to relate to the individual's view of his ability to handle de-

cisions, and as such would certainly have a bearing on what we have been

calling decisiveness.

Other important aspects of decisiveness are one's

satisfaction with his decisions, the significance one attributes to

making "good decisions," and the number of decisions one feels he must
make in his daily life.
Before attempting to elaborate on these dimensions so as to generate
a meaningful line of research, let us look at how some of them have

previously been found to relate to personality factors and psychological
adjustment.

Milner, Beech and Walker (1971) found that obsessive

subjects ask for more information prior to making a decision than normals*

Harris (1970) also focused on the amount of information demanded by a
decision-maker as related to personality factors.

Other studies relat-

ing aspects of decision-making behavior to personality variables in-

clude Gentile and Schipper (1966)

,

which emphasizes risk-taking behavior.

Ivan Steiner, personal communication
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and Pollay (1970), focusing on decision time and difficulty of decisions.

One series of studies which is particularly relevant to the present re-

search is that of Denner (1968a, 1968b)

,

who examined need for informa-

tion and a high concern for the real-unreal distinction as decision-

making variables which have far-reaching implications.

His conclusions

are instructuve:
to the extent that the decision-maker becomes involved
in the process of decision-making rather than in the
ultimate effects of decision-making, he may deceive
others through failure to act .... Could the repeated
failure to act when direct action is called for, coupled
with the suppression that one has failed, produce a
condition wherein the individual is plagued with vague
feelings of uneasiness called anxiety (1968a, p. 531)?

These studies and others (some of which will be cited later in our

description of our measures) all deal with one or more of a limited

number of aspects of decision-making which were related to other clinical
variables.

It is not assumed that these dimensions exhau&t all possible

aspects of decisiveness, but they do seem to include the most central
aspects.

We will now look more closely at these dimensions of decisive-

ness, paying particular attention to how they relate to each other and

how

ftach

of them addresses itself to a slightly different aspect.

Earlier in this chapter decisiveness was defined as the ability of
the individual to engage in the decision-making process.

Each of the

dimensions of decisiveness we will be focusing on assesses a particular
aspect of one's ability to engage in the decision-making process, and
further looks at decision-making from a particular vantage point.

Thus,

some dimensions relate to the person's assessment of his performance on

particular decision-making tasks, while others look at one's general
confidence in decision-making situations or one's readiness to accept
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responsibility for decisions.

Our dimensions of decisiveness can also

be classified according to the nature of the "data source."

Thus, one

nay elicit information about an individual's decision-making ability
by measuring performance on a decision-making task, by asking the
individual how confident or satisfied he is with his performance on

a task, by being even more direct and asking the individual directly

how he sees his decision-making ability, or by asking someone else
who knows him how good a decision-maker he is.

All of these dimensions,

by tapping both a number of aspects of the decision-making process and
a number of "data sources," complement each other in yielding a compre-

hensive view of an individxial s ability to engage in the decision-making
'

process.

We can now be more specific as to the particular dimensions of
decisiveness which are of interest in this research.

As mentioned above,

one of the most important dimensions of decisiveness is need for information prior to making a decision, a factor which has been recognized in

An

previous research as quite central to the decision-making process.

assessment of how much information an individual requires before reaching a decision affords a basic insight into the question of his readiness
to take action, which of course is at the theoretical basis of this

research.

This dimension will therefore constitute one of our major

areas of interest.

Another dimension mentioned above is one's tendency to choose risky
alternatives as opposed to conservative, safe courses of action.

For

our purposes (and partially as a function of the nature of the instru-

ment we will be using to measure this dimension) we will refer to this
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aspect of decisiveness simply as Risk Taking .

As in the case of Need

For Information, an assessment of an Individual's
Risk Taking behavior
speaks directly to one's readiness to take action, for if
one demands a

high 14val of certainty before pursuing a particular alternative,
one
is less likely to feel able to take effective action in
the many

decleion-making situations which entail high uncertainty.

We have also already mentioned two other dimensions. Confidence in
pe<^isio^8 and Tendency to Defer Decisions , as being relevant to
the

decision-making process, particularly in terms of one's subjective
feelings about one's ability to make decisions.

Looking at all four

dimensions for a moment, it can be seen that they all would seem to be

fairly contingent on specific decision-making situations, for one's "score"

on each of them may vary considerably as a function of the kind of de-

cision being made.

That is, one may require a great amount of informa-

tion and a high level of certainty in one situation, but not in another,
and in order to assess these dimensions, it would seem quite necessary
to supply the individual with such a specific decision-making situation.
In addition to the fact that they are all "situation-specific,"

these dimensions share another quality, in that they are not subjective

or phenoneno logical.

That is, they do not actually relate to an indi-

vidual's own assessment of how good a decision-maker he thinks he is,
but rather they examine specific aspects of how an individual performs
in the decision-making process.

Thus, even though one may use a "self-

report" procedure for assessing one's confidence in a decision or his

tendency to defer a decision, one is it ill Involved in a specific

decision-making situation related to actual performance.

In order to
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gain inflight into the more purely subjective sense one may
have of his

own decision-making ability, a fifth dimension needs to be added
to
our list, a dimension we shall call Self Appraisal of Decisiveness

.

By

this we mean exactly what the name implies, a global, impressionistic

assessment by the individual himself of his own decision-making ability.

While we could no doubt generate a number of other dimensions of
decisiveness, only one other will be added.

This dimension is similar

to the preceding one in that it employs a global assessment of decisive-

ness, but it has the important distinction of objectivity in terms of
the data source.

Thus, our sixth dimension is the Peer Rating of

Decisiveness . which involves an assessment of an individual's ability
to make decisions from the perspective of someone else who knows the

decision-maker.

These six dimensions of decisiveness, then, all tap different
aspects of the decision-making process stemming from a variety of

sources of data.

Our use of a nximber of dimensions of decision-making

behavior is consistent with our two-fold goal for this research Implied
In the title:

(1)

understanding more about the nature of decisiveness

as a characteristic of individuals, and (2) learning something about the

relationship of decisiveness to psychological adjustment.

In the first

case, the goal will be achieved by obtaining a number of measures of

decisiveness from a variety of sources » and then looking at the relationship between the various measures and how they interact with each

other in relation to our measures of psychological adjustment.

Our

second goal will be addressed by obtaining a number of measures of both
psychological adjustment and level of performance in a variety of
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situations, and then relating these data to the decisiveness measures.

Before presenting our major hypothesis which specifies the relationship

between the decisiveness and adjustment measures, it is necessary to
discuss the particular dimensions of adjustment which would be most

useful to examine.
Adjustment and Performance Dimensions

We will discuss the specific instruments in the next chapter, but
it is appropriate here to discuss, from the theoretical perspective,

our choice of certain kinds of indicators of psychological adjustment
and level of performance.

Some of the dimensions which will be used

have already been discussed in relation to the theoretical background
of this research.

These include self-esteem, level of anxiety in rela-

tion to a stressful situation, satisfaction with life, and depression.

Our intention in retaining these dimensions of adjustment as focal
points for this research is to obtain a relatively broad picture of the

individual's adjustment and reaction to stress.

In addition to these

aspects of adjustment, other areas of interest emerge from both the

literature and from one's intuitive sense of how decisiveness may affect

other areas of ftinctioning.

Thus, obsessiveness would seem to be a

worthwhile trait to examine, for it both reflects a style of cognition

which closely parallels the individual's actual decision-making process
(examining fine detail, feeling doubt about one's actions, and so on) and
speaks to the individual's patterns of handling stress and coping with
life.

Additional indicators of psychological adjustment which might
relate to decisiveness are the level of resentment one feels and social
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or Interpersonal factors like alienation from others and anomie.

These

dimensions are relevant in that they tap both the individual's reaction
to his life situation (resentment) and his feeling in the interpersonal

area of his life.

Both of these areas clearly may be affected by one's

ability to negotiate the nxjmerous decisions one faces in daily life.
Finally, some more objective measures of the individual's ability
to perform in normal life situations would be of interest, including

indicators of academic performance and ratings made by others as to
the individual's overall performance in a number of areas.

Taken

together, these dimensions of adjustment and level of performance should

afford a wide ranging sample of an individual's overall ability to cope

with life and its stresses.
Hypothesis

The general and overriding hypothesis which emerges from this posi-

tion is that decisive individtials show better psychological adjustment

and a higher level of performance than indecisive ones .

Stated more

specifically, a person who has a difficult time making decisions and

who perceives himself as a poor decision-maker also has a difficult
time coping with life and its stresses.

Given the fact that the present investigation involves a number
of dimensions of decisiveness, it is important to note a premise which
is Implicit in this hypothesis, and which itself is of interest as a

subject of this research.

This premise is that the various dimensions

of decisiveness correlate with each other .

For example, it is expected

that a person who shows a high need for information before making a

decision will also tend to defer decisions more to others, demand
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greater certainty before choosing a risky alternative, think of
himself
as a poor decision-maker, and so on.

This premise is important in that

It speaks to both the relationship between decisiveness and
psychological

adjustment and the question of whether decisiveness is a general trait

Incorporating all of the dimensions discussed above, or whether it is
actually a multidimensional concept with little relationship between the

various dimensions.
TWO points of clarification are in order here.

First, the hypothesis

is intended to be correlational or descriptive, rather than causal.

It

Is not being claimed that Indecisiveness causes anxiety or depression or

low self-esteem, but rather that these phenomena are closely related in
a functional way.

This kind of relationship is consistent with the

phenomenological emphasis presented in our theoretical discussion.
The second point of clarification is based on the fact that, while
it is expected that the various dimensions of decisiveness will correlate

with each other, it is also expected that some dimensions will

relate^^

more strongly to particular aspects of psychological adjustment than
will other dimensions.

In fact, our theoretical emphasis on the sub-

jective or phenomenological aspects of decisiveness suggests that the

more subjective dimensions of decisiveness will show the strongest
relationship to psychological adjustment.
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CHAPTER

II

METHOD

The following methodology is designed with a number of
purposes
la mind.

First, it is Intended to distinguish between decisive
and

Indecisive subjects on all of the major dimensions of decisiveness

mentioned in the preceding chapter.

Different types of measures, in-

cluding aelf-report, structured laboratory procedures, and peer ratings
are used in order to obtain data on the validity of our measures and
concepts, and to increase the scope of the questions we can address.

The adjustment measures also use a combination of self-report, peer
ratings, and objective Indicators of performance.

The measures are also

chosen with the intention of striking a balance between controlled lab-

oratory procedures and data collected in actual, "real life" situations.

Taken together, the data obtained through these measures are intended
to afford a fairly comprehensive picture of the relationship between

decisiveness and psychological adjustment.
Subjects

Students in a number of undergraduate psychology courses at a
large state university were asked to participate in a study of decision-

making in various kinds of situations, and were given course credit
for their participation.

Over 250 volunteers (out of an estimated

1000 students enrolled in the courses) reported to the testing sessions,

with virtually all of them falling into the 18-22 year old age group,
and approximately 60% being female.

Of this group, 228 (120 females,

108 males) subjects returned valid, complete questionnaires.

The fact
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that only 25Z of potential subjects volunteered and that
more of them

were females suggests a possible sampling bias, a question we
will consider later.

The subjects reported In groups of approximately 30 to

the testing session, during which the major measures of decisiveness
and

psychological adjustment were administered.

At the conclusion of each

session (which lasted approximately 90 minutes) all subjects were requested to supply the names and addresses of two friends or relatives
(sex and age were not specified) who would be willing to complete a short

questionnaire.

The subjects' own addresses were also obtained so that

a follow-up questionnaire could be sent to them.

Measures and Procedures

The subjects began the experimental session with the central

measure of Need For Information, an Instrument called the Expanded
Judgment Task.

This Instrument Is also the basis for the measure of

Confidence In Decisions.

It requires the subject to make decisions on

ths basis of a limited amount of Information, with the option to demand

additional Information before reaching a decision.

In this way, data

as to the amoijnt of Information required before reaching a decision Is

obtained, along xrlth a confidence rating for each decision.
The specific procedure was as follows:

each subject received three

decks of cards, with each card consisting of a picture of either a
square or a circle.

All subjects received Identical sets of cards, in

which the number of circles and the previously randomized order of
prasentatlon In each deck was the same for all subjects.

Subjects were

informed both In written directions and through oral description by the

experimenter that the task Is to make a decision as to the ratio of
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•qxiares to circles as soon as one believes he has seen
enough of the 50

cards to reach this decision, with the "hint" that the number
of

and squares Is a multiple of 5.

drcUa

Finally, a scoring system was described

In which more "points" are awarded for early decisions than for
late:
ones, with no points being awarded for an Incorrect decision.

Thus,

the subjects have an Incentive for making an early decision, but also

must balance this against the "risk" of being Incorrect and losing all
points.

Actually, the only scores which are Important In this research

are the numbers of cards required before making each of the three

dadslons.

In addition, however, each subject was asked to give a con-

fidence rating, on a scale of 1 to 10, after each decision was made.
Thus, this Instrument yields an assessment of both the subject's Need

For Information and Confidence In Decisions.
This experimental procedure has been used extensively In previous

rMearch.

Singer and Roby (1967) used essentially the same technique

to naasure Information required before reaching a decision, substituting

colored chips for geometrical figures, a procedure also used saccess*
fully by Irwin, Smith and Mayfleld (1956),

Pruitt (1961)

.

A tachlstlscoplc version was used by Andrews and Boldt

(1965) and Croft (1962).

Audley (196A)

,

Irwin and Smith (1957) and

In the Singer and Roby (1967) study and in

the use of this measure as both a direct assessment of

xiMd for information and an Indirect assessment of time required before

rMching a decision

Is discussed.

The use of geometrical designs

printed on cards was used by Brody (1963)

,

and Is an adaptation of the

probability learning method of Jarvlk (1951).
vtt

In the present research

followed Brody' 8 administration procedure, the directions for which
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«r« Included in the Appendix, along with a sample scoring
sheet.

Following the administration of this Instrument, which took
approximately 20 to 30 minutes, two questionnaire-type instruments
assessing

other dimensions of decisiveness were administered.

The first of these

is the Choice Dilemma Questionnaire (Wallach and Kogan,
1959; Kogan and

Wallach, 1961, 1964; and Wallach, Kogan, and Bem, 1962), a 12-ltem

device which assesses the subject's tendency to choose risky or cautious
alternatives in a variety of situations requiring decisions.

Previous

research xising this instrument has reported satisfactory reliability
•tatiatics (Wallach and Kogan, 1961; Wallach et al .
Wallach, 1964)

,

.

1962; Kogan and

and its self-report format is consistent with our

theoretical emphasis on the experience of making decisions.

This taak

xaqxilres the subject to decide what level of certainty of outcome he

would demand before opting for a particularly risky, but quite desirable*
alternative.

The score consists of the average level of risk acceptable

to the subject across all 12 items, with a high score corresponding to a

willingness to make a risky decision (low guarantee of success), and
therefore to decisive behavior.

Clearly, this instrument is being uaed

to tap what we have called the dimension of Risk Taking.

A copy of

this Instrument is found in the Appendix.

Thus far, three of the dimensions of decisiveness have been

addraaaed by the two instruments described above.

The next inotxuaant

la specifically designed to tap our fourth dimension. Tendency to Defer

Daclaiona.

This is a 10-ltem instrument which presents different

decia ion-making situations to the subject, with the request that he

ala^ly note on a 7-point scale his feeling as to whether he would sake
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th« decialon himself or instead choose to defer to someone else.

The

•core for this measure Is the average tendency to defer decisions
to
othttrs, across all 10 items, with a low score indicating a low
tendency

to defer, and hence decisive behavior.

As this instrument has only

recently been developed, reliability and validity statistics are not
available, so we will pay close attention to this in our data analysis.
copy of this test is contained in the Appendix.

Although subjects were generally able to work at their own pace

with

thastt three

decisiveness instruments, a short break was introduced

In the session at about this point, and subjects were encouraged to

Mk

any questions they might have.

They were also encouraged to give

thair beat possible performance, and then were told that the results of
this research would be made available to them at a later date.

In addi-

tion to supplying this information, the break was useful in that the

remaining instruments were of a very different sort, and a short rest

Meaed appropriate.
The rest of the instruments administered during this session were

actually combined into one comprehensive questionnaire, divided into
•everal parts.

This entire questionnaire is contained in the Appendix,

just as presented to the subjects, with the exception that labals ara

added when necessary to inform the reader as to which questions tap

which dimension of decisiveness or adjustment.
Tha first part of this questionnaire is a "pure" self-report

Msaisnant of the individual's perception of his own ability
dacisions.

to make

This part was developed by the researcher, and simply aska

tha subjact seven direct questions about his decision-making ability.
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This is our Self Appraisal of Decisiveness Measure.

Next, some general

background data Is elicited from the subject, Including year
at school,
n*jor, religion, sex, participation In extracurricular
activities, drug
use, plans to seek psychdloglcal guidance, and so on.

Following this,

the first measures of psychological adjustment are presented.

This part

of the questionnaire is actually a combination of self-report devices

which have been used in previous research to assess satisfaction with
life and specific components of satisfaction.

A detailed description

of these two items is contained in Robinson and Shaver (1969), along

with a discussion of reliability and validity of the data.
is suannarlzed in the following quotation:

Their utility

"While the use of such global

measures obscures known complexities in these assessments.

..

.they do

produce predictable findings with uncommon regularity" (p. 11).

The

first Item is a three alternative question used by Gurin, Vemoff , and

Feld (1960)

,

and again by Bradbum

az^d

Caplovitz (1965)

.

The second

Item^ls a three alternative question of life satisfaction used by

Converse and Robinson (1965).

These items are the first two questions

In the part called Self Appraisal Questionnaire. Part 2 (see Appendix).

The next instniment is a more comprehensive series of questions

which generates data on a number of dimensions of psychological adjust-*
nent, including satisfaction with life, self-esteem, lack of social

support (alienation), anomie, depression, sadness, and resentment*

us* of this instrument is reported in Bachman et al

.

(1967).

Ths

Finally,

the last part of this questionnaire consists of the 18 itons from the

MKPI which have been shown to cluster around the trait of obsesslveness
(scale 131, or the "neurotic overcontrol scale," developad by Block, 1953).
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The completion of this questionnaire and the instruments
previously
described, then, generates some wide ranging data on the
subjects'

decisiveness and adjustment in a number of areas.

At the conclusion of

the administration of these measures, names and addresses of
friends or

relatives were obtained from each subject, so that the Peer Rating

Questionnaires could be sent out, along with the addresses of the subjects themselves, so that a Final Self Appraisal could be mailed at a
later date.

The first of these mailed questionnaires, the Peer Rating

Questionnaire, consisted of the identical items found in the Self

Appraisal of Decisiveness, except that the wording was changed to the
"third person" instead of the "first person."

Bating of Decisiveness.

This measure is our Peer

Along with this instrument are some additional

questions about how the peer sees the subject's social and academic
performance.

We shall refer to this series of questions as the Peer

Rating of Performance.
The Final Self Appraisal Questionnaire was mailed to coincide with
the time of final examinations, because part of its function was to

assess the subject's reaction to a stressful situation.

This part of

the questionnaire asks the subject to rate his anxiety in relation to

final examinations, and constituted or measure of anxiety under stress.

This Instrument is modelled after the rating scales used by Janls (1958)
In his studies of anxiety associated with hospital treatment, and have

yielded reliable results.

Following these five items, a number of

additional questions assess the subjects' expectations and satisfaction

vith academic and social life.
Appraisal of Performance.

These latter items constitute our Self

Subjects were asked to return this questionnaire
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In person, so that they could be given some preliminary
written feed-

back on the experiment and so that some short Interviews could
be conducted by this researcher to gain some open-ended insight into
how the
subjects saw their decisiveness and its relationship to adjustment.

Both

of the mailed questionnaires along with a copy of the written
feedback

given to subjects are found in the Appendix.
The methodological distinctions between these measures, which

exactly parallel the theoretical distinctions between the dimensions they

are designed to tap, will be quite important in our interpretation of
results, so it is well to specify them here.

Recalling our earlier

classification of the detlslveness dimensions, we note that the measures
can be classified according to both the format for data collection and
the data source.

Thus, we have four behavioral, task-oriented measures

(Need For Information, Confidence in Decisions, Risk Taking, and Tendency
to Defer Decisions) as contrasted with two global, impressionistic

measures.

In this classification according to format for data collection,

our theoretical emphasis on the phenomenological approach to decisiveness
suggests that the impressionistic measures would relate more strongly to
decisiveness.

On the other hand, in terms of data source we would group

the four behavioral instruments together with the peer rating measure,
for both the peer ratings and the behavioral measures are objective

assessments of decision-making behavior.

That is, they are based on

decision-making performance . either in a laboratory task or as observed

by someone else.

Self Appraisal of Decisiveness clearly represents the

opposite extreme, being based on the subjective view of the subject
himself.

34

CHAPTER III
RESULTS

The following presentation of results is concerned with two funda-

mental and interrelated questions.

The first question can be viewed as

essentially methodological, and it Includes test validity of the individual measures and intercorrelations between measures.

However, thle

question also helps to shed light on the nature of decisiveness as

reflected by our measures.

The second question concerns the relationship

between the decisiveness and adjustment measures, which is the major
focus of this investigation.

The strong interrelationship of these two

questions is seen in the fact that any interpretation of relationships

between decisiveness and adjustment measures must take into consideration any results which can be attributed to measurement variables.

Because of the great amount of data bearing on each of these questions,
the data will be presented in stages, looking first at the test validity

of the measures and then at the relationship between the decisiveness

and adjustment measures.

The question of measurement contamination of

results, or "methods variance," will be considered at several points
in this presentation, using data from both of the major stages.

Test Validity of the Measures

The question of test validity is important in any research Involv-

ing clinical variables and such diffuse concepts as "decisiveness,"
and a valuable discussion of this whole question can be found in

Chronbach and Meehl (1955).

In the present research, the qixestion of

test validity Is important in two respects.

First, it is important to
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determine If the various Items on a given Instrument
correlate significantly with each other, such that we are justified In
considering a
single, total score for that Instrument.

This also relates to whether

or not a particular Instrument is tapping a single dimension,
or

whether It Itself Is multl-dlmenslonal.

Second, It Is Important to

determine If the various measures of decisiveness correlate with each
other. Implying an overriding trait of "decisiveness," or whether the

various measures of decisiveness tap entirely different and unrelated
aspects of decisiveness.
Interna l reliability of the measures .

The first question was

addressed In a number of ways, for it is Important to determine the
reliability of the various Instruments used in this study.

There are

six major measures of decisiveness, which for statistical purposes can

be thought of as our independent var^-^bles, with each variable tapping
a partlctilar aspect of the decision-making process in a different way.
Thus, we have Need For Information scores, consisting of three separate

trials of the Expanded Judgsient Task; the Confidence in Decisions scores,

also based on the three trials of the Expanded Judgment Task; the Ten-

dency to Defer Decisions scores, based on the 10 items of Stelner*s
scale; the Risk Taking scores, based on the 12 items of the Choice

Dilemma Questionnaire; the Self Appraisal of Decisiveness scores, based
on the seven point scale developed by the researcher; and finally, the

Peer Rating of Decisiveness scores, aimed at validating the subject's

own self-appraisal.
The initial statistical procedures consisted of securing Pearson

Product Correlation Coefficients, pairing each individual item on a
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given measure with every other Item and with
the total score for that
measure.

These inter-item and item-total correlations afford
a picture

of the internal reliability of each of the major
independent measures.

The results, which are summarized in Table 1, lead to
the following

conclusions for each of the independent measures:

^)

Need For Information - Correlation coefficients between
scores for each of the three trials range from .64 to
.71,
and correlation coefficients between scores for each trial
and the total score range from .86 to .90, all coefficients
being significant at the .001 level. Thus, we observe very
high internal reliability, and are therefore justified in
considering a single, total score for this dimension.

2)

Confiden ce in Decisions - Results here are almost identical
to the Need For Information results, with inter-item cor-

relation coefficients ranging from .62 to .69, and itemtotal correlations ranging from .87 to .90 (p <• .001). The
similarity is expected, of course, given that these two
measures were based on different aspects of the same decisionmaking task. Thus, we are justified in using the total score
as our measure of Confidence in Decisiona.
3)

Risk Taking - Here, the results are somewhat less significant,
but still within acceptable limits. The item-total correlation coefficients range from .38 to .52, all significant at
the .001 level. Most of the inter-item correlation coefficients
lie in the range of .20, which is also significant at the .001
level. However, a number of lower correlations occur, along
with an occasional negative correlation, but none of the
negative correlations are statistically significant. Thus,
we observe consistently high item- total correlations, and
predominantly positive, significant inter-item correlations,
and we are therefore justified in considering the total score
for Risk Taking. We will look more closely at these results
with the help of factor analytic techniques and split-half
reliability correlations later.

4)

Tendency to Defer Decisions - In this case, the restxlts are
much more ambiguous, making it difficult to justify considering the ten items together as a single scale. As can be
seen in Table 1, there are a great many non-significant and
even negative correlations between items, and while all
Itemr-total correlations are significant, they are of much
smaller magnitude than in the other measures. Although it
it difficult to make a final assessment on the basis of
these data, it appears that this is a multidimenalooal scales

37

!t

^ CO

4t

41

i

H

i

Ik

1

c^^t «>»r\

lliH

CVi*HCsJCSJO<^CM«-iCvKi

OOv^Ov^iHOOO
I

3

PI
so

w>

r*» rtv

00 ChCO
•

•

total

•

Ml
•

•

^ ^ CO 6> c^oo

OS

•

I
§

L

CD

O O 00
Oo
«^^o

CVi

o o
•

O

«H

6-00
^^
CM <^ *H

CNi

CM
•

^?^flo

•

CM

•

*H

31
I

1

1

I

CM

csi

•

I

^

I

O^
O

»o

e»^^Ofl0^O

^^^^
i

Trial

^
CM iH

* « $ I

1
•

CM

i *

i

CM c^J4'
CM

^ <M r\

CSO
•
•

I

•

u

I

8^v\
o o•

I

•

•

V

sf

Pi Pi

i

I
CM

CM

I
I

I

Ma

^ CM

V>\0 C^CO

OnO

^ CM

V
A

38

••••••••«,
*

I

3
OS

Hllhl
I

OOOOOOOv-*
On On
«H CM
^

>'> C»- <Nj

^
OOO

VO
CD

CVI

v-e

pO
oO

»-i Cs- *-i

II

« » I

^•

w-t

^• ^•

>(<

>i>

•

«H <H
•

O• O

•

«H
•
I

M ^)NO'«
^• «H• • v>•
•

\f\

CSi

•

I I

M• «H•

N•

o• o•
•

«-l

•

CM CM
•

•

«H

vO
^p
PP
•

frw frw <s| tvj c>w

«h

HI

Ml
vO

••••••

O

oooooo

NO

•

CD

VO
Qv

00

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

I

III

J}-

«H

VO 00

oo

s
s

PP

*H CM

I

I
O

ea

v^so c^co

ovo

H
I
£

vr\\o

C".

39

In that items do not correlate well with
each other, but
that these differences balance with each
other such that
significant correlations are observed between
each item and
the total score. Thus, any use of the total
score as a
reliable indication of "tendency to defer decisions"
must
take into account these poor inter-item correlations.
We
will have more to say on this measure later.

Self Appraisal of Decisiveness - These correlational
data are
much more clear. Items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 all correlate
quite
highly with each other and with the total score, while
items
5 and 6 yield lower correlations with all the other items and
with the total score. Now, looking briefly at the content
of
Items 5 and 6 (see Appendix) , we note that these two questions
deal with whether big or small decisions are more difficult,
while the other items all tap a more general dedls ion-making
ability. On the basis of these data and the factor analytic
data which will be discussed below, we may conclude that it
makes the best sense to consider the total of items
1, 2, 3,
4, and 7 as the total score for Self Appraisal of Decisiveness.
6)

Peer Ratin g of Decisiveness - Before looking at the data in
Table 1 for this measure, a point of clarification is in order.
During the administration of the laboratory instruments,
the names of two peers or relatives of each subject were
secured, thus yielding two sets of "Peer Ratings" for each
subject.
It turned out that one peer rating form was returned
for almost all subjects (209 out of 228), but only 149 subjects
had both forms returned. If we considered only those subjects
for whom both peer rating forms had been received, our sample
size would have been reduced by over 25% for the remaining
analyses. However, since there was a strong correlation
between the two peer rating forms when both were available
(r-.36, p < .001) and also between each individual form and the
total of both forms (r».81, .84, p < .001), it was decided to
consider only the first peer's decisiveness ratings, that
i8,< ottly one of the peer rating forms for each subject*
Therefore, the data in Table 1 are based on the ratings
of a single peer, but they have been shown to be a valid
indication of both peers' ratings. The conclusions to be
reached are identical with those described above for Self
Appraisal of Decisiveness, with items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 correlating most strongly with each other.

These preliminary analyses, then, show that we are justified in

using a single score for Need For Information, Confidence In Decisions,
Risk Taking, Self Appraisal of Decisiveness, and Peer Rating of Decisiveness.

That is, these measures are based on individual trials or individual
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Items which correlate highly with each
other and with a total score for

all Items.

We may also conclude, at least tentatively,
that the Items

Included In the total score for a given measure
tap the same dimension
of decisiveness.

Howvcr, to further Investigate this, and to
help

clarify the ambiguous results on Tendency to Defer
Decisions, additional

statistical procedures are needed.
First, split-half reliability measures were
obtained for the Items

on the Risk Taking and Tendency to Defer Decision
Instruments.

Separ-

ating the Items on each scale Into odd-numbered and
even-numbered groups,
total scores were calculated for each group, which were then
correlated

with total scores for the other group.
.52 (p

<

Correlation coefficients of

.001) between the split-halves of Risk Taking and of -.03 (not

significant) between the split-halves of Tendency to Defer Decisions

were observed.

Thus, In the case of Risk Taking, we are further justified

in considering the items together as a single score, but our initial

skepticism about the Items constituting Tendency to Defer Decisions is
increased, for the two halves do not correlate with each other.

A final procedure was used to help shed light on the composition
of the Tendency to Defer Decisions scale, factor analysis.^

These data

are summarized in Table 2, in which factor loadings (oblique solution)

and the percent of variance accounted for by each factor are shown.
It is apparent from these data that each of the factors is accounting

The computer program which was used for the factor analyses is described in Nle, Bent, and Hull (1970). Initial factors were extracted
with Iteration, then rotated to an oblique solutioil, with Delta (degree
of obliqueness) equal to 0. The program was run on a CDC 3600 computer
at the University of Massachusetts.
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TiBLB 2

Ikoter Loadings for Itons on Tendency to Defer Decisions sad
Baroeat of VsrlAneo Accounted for tiy Bach Factor

Items

FVetor I

Faotor II

Factor III

Factor lY

ft^etor Y

1

-.38

.05

-.15

-.01

-.04

2

.30

-.05

-.22

-.20

•04

3

.01

.16

-.03

•04

-.35

.38

.28

.00

16

-•05

5

.14

-.02

.66

-•03

-.03

6

.01

.17

-.06

.09

•44

7

-.02

11

.02

-.56

-.06

8

.26

.04

.05

-.06

•01

9

-.17

.05

.05

-.05

.03

10

-.03

.59

•00

-.15

.01

•

•

Faotor Conposition and Percent of Yariance Acoomted for

Factor
I

II

Item Coaposltion
-1,
10,

2,

4

4,

8

"by

Psrcent of Yariaace

27.6
24^9

III

5

18.9

lY

-7

15.1

-3» 6

13.6

Y

eeeh Factor
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for a significant percentage of the total variance, so we are dealing

with a multidimensional scale.

Given this result, a second split-half

reliability test was performed, grouping the items in such a way as to

make sure that there was a mixture of items from a given factor in both
halves.

2

This would help to rule out any speculation that the original

split-half results were an artifact of having coincidentally split the

halves according to major factors.

The results were essentially identi-

cal to the initial split-half, with r^.02, a non-significant correlation.
Thus, this scale does not seem to be measuring a single trait of

"tendency to defer decisions," but rather a number of dimensions, so

caution must be exercised in drawing any conclusions from data based
on a total score for this scale.

Yet, because of the relatively high

item-total correlations observed, we will "play with" the total score
in some of our analyses in order to see if any more light can be shed

on this dimension.

These preliminary analyses, all dealing with the reliability of
the measures used, enable us to conclude that with the exception of
the Tendency to Defer Decisions scale, each of our measures demonstrates

good internal reliability, and we may therefore consider the total
score for each measure.

This, of course, does not speak to the question

of the validity of the measures, but only to their internal reliability.

We now begin to address this question with a look at the relationship

between the various measures of decisiveness.

^alf A

- items 1,6,8,9,10.

Half B

«=

items 2,3,4,5,7.
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Correlat ions among the measures of decisiveness

.

As In the case

of our assessment of internal reliability, we begin now with a matrix
of correlation coefficients, this time pairing the total score for each
of the decisiveness measures with the total score for every other de-

cisiveness measure.

The matrix is contained in Table 3, and leads to

the following observations:
1)

Need For Information and Confidence in Decisions correlate
fairly well (r=.2A, p < .001) with each other, with confidence
increasing as need for information increases. The direction of
this correlation is somewhat unexpected, for high Need For
Information corresponds to indecisive behavior, while high
Confidence in Deciaions corresponds to decisive behavior.
However, this result makes sense in terms of methodological
and theoretical factors. Thus, both dimensions are tapped
by the same instrument, so it is possible that methods factors
account for the positive relationship. More importantly, one
could make the theoretical argument that one tends to feel
"safer" and thus ipore confident with a greater amount of information, so confidence is not really a measure of "decisiveness" as such but only a function of how "safe" a person judges
his decision to be.

2)

The four behavioral measures. Need for Information, Confidence
in Decisions, Risk Taking, and Tendency to Defer Decisions tend
to correlate with each other at a significance level of .05,
with the exception of the pairing of Risk Taking and Tendency
to Defer Decisions. However, the correlation coefficients are
small, so much of the variance is unaccounted for.

3)

The two impressionistic, global measures (Self Appraisal of
Decisiveness and Peer Rating of Decisiveness) do not correlate
with any of the other decisiveness measures, but they do
correlate with each other. The one exception is that Self
Appraisal of Decisiveness does correlate with Tendency to
Defer Decisions. This observed correlation between the behavioral measures on the one hand, and among the impressionistic
measures on the other hand, speaks for convergent validity of
the decisiveness measures within the two observational modes,
but not across modes.
•

We are now in a position to begin to formulate some of the above
analyses in theoretical terms.

Beginning with six different instruments

designed to tap aspects of decision-making behavior, we have looked at

TABLE 3

Correlation Matrix of Relationship laetween Decisiveness Measures

viPAOfTDTpa
MJiASUHba

NFI

Need For Confidence Risk
Taking
in
InformaDecisions _
tion
.24***

1.00

1.00

CID

.15*

.13*

.05

.06

.14*

.01

.04

.04

.09

.02

.03

.16**

.11

1.00

RT

Tendency Self Ap- Peer
to Defer apraisal Rating
Decis ions of Dec, of Dec

1.00

TDD

1.00

SAD

.21**

1.00

PRD

**
**
*

pC.OOl
p< .01

P<.05

45

the Internal composition of each instrument and found that all but one

yielded data which justify considering the instrument in its entirety,
as a single measure of some aspect of decision-making.

In the other

case, the results are ambiguous, but it seems to be a multidimensional
scale.

Finally, a correlation was observed between most of the behavior-^

al, task-oriented instruments, no relationship between the behavioral and

impressionistic instruments, and a positive relationship between the
two impressionistic measures.

In all cases of interrelationships between

decisiveness measures, however, correlations are rather low even when
significant, so we are clearly not accounting for a great deal of the

variance and thus are missing much of what constitutes decisiveness.
The conclusion which emerges for this is that we do have a number of

instruments which are reliably measuring some aspects of decisiveness
(given the face validity of our measures)

,

but each instrument seems

to be tapping a slightly different aspect, and the greatest distinction
is that between the behavioral Instruments and the impressionistic self

and peer appraisals.

This last point is particularly important, given

our interest in the phenomenological approach to decisiveness.

At this

point our main conclusion is that our measures are not tapping a single,
global trait of decisiveness, but rather a number of dimensions which
do bear some relationship to each other.

Of course, even the relatively

light of
low correlations which were observed must be interpreted in the

possible contamination due to methods factors.

We will address this

question shortly.
Correlatlo nK amonp; the measures of adjustment

.

As outlined in

consist of a number of
the preceding chapter, the adjustment measures
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multi-item scales, both self-report and peer rating, along with some
objective backgrovind and performance data and a number of single,
specific questions about drug use, coping with stress, and so on.

way of summary, the multi-item adjustment measures are:

By

«

General Self

Appraisal (see Appendix), Satisfaction in Life, Self-esteem, Alienation,
Anomie, Depression, Sadness, Obsessiveness

,

Resentment, Anxiety on

Exams, Peer Rating of Subject's Performance, and Self Appraisal of Performance.

The objective adjustment and performance indicators include

Grade Point Average, Verbal Scholastic Aptitude Test, Mathematics

Scholastic Aptitude Test, report of drug use to cope with stress, report
of physical symptoms as a reaction to stress, and report of desire for

psychological guidance.

The background data include the subjects' sex,

year at school, religion, and participation in extracurricular and
athletic activities.
The same statistical procedures used earlier were applied here to

determine the internal reliability of our multi-item adjustment measures,
these data can be summarized quite readily, for essentially the same
results were observed for each of the major adjustment measures.

Inter-

item correlations for each measure range from .20 to .50, and itemtotal correlations rajige from .40 to .89, with all correlation coefficients

being significant beyond the .001 level.

which tap various aspects of psychological

Thus, our multi-item scales

adjustment all yield inter-

nally reliable results, and we are justified in using only the total
score for each scale.

Looking next at correlations between the various measures of adjustment, a correlation matrix pairing the total score for each
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adjustment measure with the total score for every other measure was
generated.

These data are also straightforward.

All of the measures

tend to correlate fairly well with each other at a level of significance

beyond the .001 level.

The only major exceptions are that Anxiety on

Examinations does not correlate significantly with most of the measures,
and Self Appraisal of Performance does not correlate with Obsessiveness.
No reason for these exceptions is apparent, but this question will be

addressed in our discussion of methods variance.

At this point, however,

we are justified in concluding that because of the strong relationship

between these measures, we can consider a total score for these
measures (excluding Anxiety on Examinations) in addition to the scores
for each measure separately.

Because of the fact that some of these

measures represent "positive" traits while others represent "negative"
traits, the scoring of the negative dimensions (Depression, Alienation,

Anomie, and so on) was reversed, so our new variable. Overall Adjustment, is homogenous ia scoring, with a high score representing better

adjustment.

We have, then, a number of decisiveness and adjustment measures

which are based on multi-item scales that have been shown to be internally reliable, and in the case of the adjustment measures, to

correlate well with each other.

It is our next task to look at the

relationship of the decisiveness measures to the adjustment measures.

Relationship Between Decisiveness and Adjustment Measures
In order to obtain as broad an overview as possible of the relationmeasures.
ship between our decisiveness measures and all of the adjustment
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a comprehensive series of t-tests was performed.

Specifically, the

distribution of scores for each of the six decisiveness
measures was
examined, and the upper and lower quartiles of each distribution
were

used to generate "extreme groupings" for each of the
dimensions of
decisiveness.

All distributions met criteria for normalcy.

Then,

using these extreme groups, a series of t-tests involving each of
the

measures was done.

We thus have a direct assessment of whether "high"

or "low" decisive subjects on a given dimension have better adjustment
scores.

Table 4 contains a complete summary of the entire series of comparisons.

Only significant t-scores are shown in the table, along with

their significance levels, so even a quick overview of the table affords
the reader with a good sense of which decisiveness measures relate most

strongly to which adjustment measures.

However, interpretation of these

data requires additional explanation.
As mentioned earlier, scoring for the decisiveness measures varies,
as does the scoring of the adjustment measures.

In order to achieve

consistency in meaning across measures so that the reader can more
easily draw conclusions from the data, the following convention was
used.

In every case, a high score means that the subject reports more

of whatever the construct name implies.

Thus, for the adjustment

measures, a high score on Self-esteem means that the subject reports

high self-esteem, a high score on Depression means that the subject
reports greater depression, and so on.

For the decisiveness measures

the same convention applies, but in some cases a high score on a

dimension corresponds to decisive behavior while in others it corresponds
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to indecisive behavior.

Specifically, low Need For Information and

Tendency to Defer Decisions imply decisive behavior, while high Risk
Taking, Confidence in Decisions, Self Appraisal of Decisiveness, and

Peer Rating of Decisiveness imply decisive behavior.

In Table 4 these

differences are reflected in the sign (direction) of the t-values.

If

the t-value is positive , this indicates that subjects who score high on
the particular decisiveness measure also tend to score high on the

adjustment measure.

If the t-value is negative, subjects who score high

on the particular decisiveness measure tend to score low on the adjust-

ment measure.

In order to aid the reader who wishes to bypass the

rather involved analysis required for interpreting each t-value, results

which are contrary to our major hypothesis are underscored in the table.
All other results are in the predicted direction.

Another point which needs clarification relates to the number of
subjects in each of the tests, which of course is important in determining
the significance levels.

The number of subjects in a given t-test is a

function of the number of subjects falling into the two extreme groups,

missing data for a given subject, and so on.

In fact, the sample size

ranged from 95 to 115, with approximately 50 subjects in each extreme
group.

"One-tail" significance levels are reported, given that our

hypothesis includes a predicted direction for all results.
Finally, in the following analyses of these t-tests, each of the

decisiveness measures will be assumed to be just that
an aspect of decisiveness.

—

a measure of

This is not to obscure the entire question

of validating these measures as aspects of decisiveness, but only to
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enable us to consider these results in terms of our
theoretical formulations.

Thus, a low Need For Information subject is considered
to be a

"high decisive" subject on the dimension of Need For Information,
a low

Confidence in Decisions subject is taken to be a "low decisive"
subject
on the dimension of Confidence in Decisions, and so on.

Having clarified some points related to interpretation of these
data, we return to an overview of Table 4.

Perhaps the most striking

result is the large number of significant t-values observed with the
two impressionistic measures. Self Appraisal of Decisiveness and Peer

Rating of Decisiveness.

We have already noted that these measures most

strongly reflect a phenomenological approach to decisiveness, so this

observation is again stressed, and will be considered in detail in the
next chapter.

It is also apparent, however, that each of the other

measures yield significant t-values.

Let us therefore consider these

data in detail, looking separately at the significant results for each
of our decisiveness measures.
1)

Need For Infonnatlon - Tliree significant differences were
observed with subjects grouped according to their NFI
scores, all in the predicted direction. Thus, we deduce
from Table 4 that low NFI (high decisive) subjects received
higher peer ratings of performance and higher verbal and
math SAT scores.

2)

Confid ence in Decisions - Again, we observe three significant
differences, all in the predicted direction. In this case,
high CID (high decisive) subjects report greater Self-esteem
and less Alienation and Anomie.

3)

Risk Taking - Here we observe only two significant differences,
and one of them is contrary to prediction. As expected, high
RT (high decisive) subjects report less Anxiety on Exams,
but they also rate themselves lower on the four General Self
Appraisal questions (which deal with social and academic life)
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4)

Tendency to Defe r Decisions - The test validity of this
measure
Is in question, of course, but putting this aside for
a moment,
we observe six significant differences, with all but one in
the
predicted direction. Thus, as expected, low TDD (high decisive)
subjects report greater Self-esteem, less Alienation, less
Anxiety on Exams, a higher GPA, and less Obsessiveness but
contrary to prediction, they also report a lower verbal SAT.
These results clearly require further discussion, including
the apparent contradictions entailed in scoring high on some
measures but low on others.
,

5)

Self Appraisal of Decisiveness - The subject groupings on this
measure yielded twelve significant differences, all in the
predicted direction. Thus, high SAD (high decisive) subjects
reported a higher General Self Appraisal, greater Satisfaction
in Life, higher Self-esteem, less Alienation, Anomle, Depression,
Sadness, Resentment, Anxiety on Exams and Obsessiveness, and
higher Self Appraisal of Performance and Overall Adjustment.
Again, these results will be discussed further, especially the
possible contamination of these data due to methods variance
or response bias.

6)

Peer Rating of Decisiveness - These data are almost identical
to the results observed in the case of Self Appraisal of Decisiveness, in that twelve significant differences were observed
in most of the same cases.
The only exception is that a significant difference was not observed in the case of Anxiety on
Exams, while one was observed for Peer Rating of Performance,
showing that subjects who were rated as decisive (high PRD) by
their peers were also rated higher on the performance questions.
An overall difference between the PRD and SAD data is that the
levels of significance are lower in the case of PRD, which again
suggests that the strong results observed for SAD may be at least
partially a function of methods variance.

Several general observations and questions emerge from these data.

We note that of 96 t-tests computed, 38 were significant.

Thus, one

question which arises is whether the pattern of significant results

which were observed can be explained theoretically, and conversely,

whether we can also understand why results were not observed in some
cases.

As suggested above, one factor which may account for this pattern

of relationships is methods variance, for the strongest relationships

are between the self-report decisiveness and adjustment measures.
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Because this factor is so important to the
interpretation of all of the
results, it will be considered now, before making
any further interpre-

tations of the data.

Methods Variance

Whenever a relationship between two measures is observed,
one must
always attempt to determine whether the relationship
is a function of
an actual relationship between the traits or constructs
or whether the

relationship is an artifact of the procedures used to obtain the
data.
In the case of self-report measures this methodological
contamination of
the results is referred to as response bias, halo effect, or problems
of social desirability.

Statistically, this is a problem of methods

variance, and it is especially important in the present investigation

because our major decisiveness measure and most of our adjustment

measures are purely self-report.
There are a number of statistical approaches to this rather difficult problem.

An excellent discussion of this general problem as well

as the specific statistical procedure which will be used in the present

investigation is found in Campbell and Fiske (1959)

.

The procedure

outlined in that paper is a "multitrait-multimethod matrix" analysis,

which can be applied to questions of convergent and discriminant validity
of measures as well as to questions of methods variance.

Multitrait-multimethod analysis

.

To briefly summarize this pro-

cedure, we note that the basic task is to separate methodological con-

tamination from data which is based on relationships between a variety
of measures.

Two types of validation of the measures are implicit in
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this procedure.

Convergent validation requires that at least
two

different, independent measures of the construct
under consideration

agree with each other.

Discriminant validation, aimed at demonstrating

that there is a valid distinction between the construct
under consideration and other constructs, requires more than one
construct or trait

being measured by the same procedure.
In multitrait-multimethod analysis, both discriminant and
con-

vergent validity are assessed in combination to validate the constructs
and particular measures as well as to estimate the degree of methods

variance which may be contaminating relationships between the measures.
The procedure employs a multitrait-multimethod correlation matrix, con-

taining correlations between two or more distinct traits which are

measured by at least two independent methods.

Most of our data is not

subject to this type of analysis, for each of our decisiveness and

adjustment dimensions is not measured by two or more independent methods.
However, we can apply this procedure to some of our data, and fortunately,
the most important methods variance question falls into this category.

This question stems from the overwhelming "superiority" we observed in
our two impressionistic measures as they relate to adjustment, which
in the case of Self Appraisal of Decisiveness, could be explained by

response bias.
In order to investigate this, we note that we do have two distinct

traits (decisiveness and performance in academic and social life) which
are measured by two independent procedures, self-appraisal and peer
ratings.

In multitrait-multimethod analysis a correlation matrix is

generated in which each correlation coefficient is classified into one
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of three major categories.^

First, there are the monotrait-heteromethod

coefficients (enclosed in rectangles in Table

5)

,

which relate to con-

vergent validity (independent measures of the same trait should
correlate

with each other).

If these values are low, the convergent validity of

the trait is in doubt.

The second category contains the heterotrait-

monomethod coefficients (enclosed in circles in Table

5)

,

and the third

category contains the heterotrait-heteromethod coefficients (enclosed
in triangles in Table 5)

.

The relative magnitudes of coefficients within

one category as opposed to coefficients within the other categories

relate to various forms of discriminant validity.

Thus, the monotrait-

heteromethod values should be higher than the heterotrait-monomethod and
the heterotrait-heteromethod values, which means that the correlation

between different measures of the same trait should be higher than
correlations between different measures of different traits and between
the same measure of a different trait.

If one of these comparisons is

reversed, contamination due to methods variance is indicated, for one

concludes that correlations between methods of data collection are more

important than the correlations between the traits themselves.

Applying this procedure to our data (Table

5)

,

we see evidence for

convergent validity of the two traits, but there is also evidence for

contamination in the relationships between the traits due to methods

is a measure in reliability of the constructs
This value is based on repeated
is the monotrait-monomethod category.
application of the same measure or application of the same measure to
As these data are not available in the present
a different sample.

A fourth category which

investigation, this category is not applicable here.
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TABLE 5

Muatitrait-multlaethod Correlation
Matrix for Self and Peer Ratings

Method A
(Self Appraisal)

Self Appraisal
of Decisiveness

Self Appraisal
of Decisiveness

Method B
(Peer Rating)

Self Appraisal
of Perforaance

1.00

Peer Rating
Peer Rating
of Decisiveness of Performance

.21**

(Method a)

Self Appraisal
of Performance

1.00

Peer Rating of
Decisiveness

.06

1.00

.22***

.43

(Method B)

Peer Rating of

Ferfomanoe

1.00

Notes Monotrait-heteromethod coefficients are enclosed in
rectangles . Heterotrait-monomethod coefficients are
enclosed in circles. Heterotrait-heteromethod coefficients are enclosed in triangles .

*** p< .001
** p< .01
*

P< .05
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variance.

Thus, the monotrait-heteromethod values
(in rectangles) are

relatively high and significant beyond the .005
level, indicating agreement between different measures of the same
traits.

Looking next at the

relative magnitude of the three categories of
coefficients, we observe
that both monotrait-heteromethod values are higher
than both heterotrait-

heteromethod values, which indicates that different measures
of the same
traits correlate better with each other than do different
measures of

different traits.

However, the most important comparison, which speaks

directly to the question of methods variance, yields mixed
results:
the monotrait-heteromethod values are only slightly larger than
one

heterotrait-monomethod value, and smaller than the other.

Specifically,

the correlation of .21 between the two independent measures of
decisive-

ness and the correlation of .22 between the independent measures of per-

formance are slightly larger than the correlation (.17) between the self-

appraisals of decisiveness and performance, suggesting that methods

contamination is a major factor.

That is, self -appraisals of different

traits (decisiveness and performance) correlate almost as highly as

different measures of each of these traits.

One must note, however,

that this investigation is in fact claiming that decisiveness correlates

with performance.

Therefore, some correlation between the same measure

of the two different traits is expected.

This makes it very difficult

to estimate how much of the correlation between the two traits as

measured by self-appraisal is due to methods contamination and how much
is due to a true relationship between the traits.

Some indication of

this is obtained in the peer rating data, in which this measure of the

two different traits yields a higher correlation (.43) than independent
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measures of each of the traits.

This is certainly evidence for methods

variance, for one would expect that different
measures of the same con-

struct would correlate better than the same measure
of different traits,

even if a correlation between the traits is expected.

Thus, while it is

still difficult to even estimate the actual magnitude of
methods variance
in these data, we can say that a considerable amount of
methods variance

contaminates the self-appraisal measures, and an even larger amount
contaminates the peer rating measures.
The conclusion to be drawn from these data is that the two constructs
involved, global assessments of decisiveness and performance, meet

criteria for convergent validity, but not for discriminant validity,
and the relationship between the measures suffers due to methods
variance.

Before making further interpretations based upon this con-

clusion, however, let us look at additional data from the perspective of

multitrait-multimethod analysis.
An overview of the adjustment and decisiveness measures shows no
other clear cases in which two distinct constructs are measured by two
or more independent procedures.

However, if we look at individual items

on some of the measures, along with theoretical and methodological sim-

ilarities between certain constructs, such a case does emerge.

Speci-

fically, two of the individual questions on the Self Appraisal of

Decisiveness and Peer Rating of Decisiveness instruments can be taken
to tap constructs which are similar to our constructs of Need For Infor-

mation and Confidence in Decisions.

The first item is question 3 on

both of the impressionistic measures, asking how much time the subject
requires in making decisions.

As discussed in the preceding chapter.
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this construct is closely related both
theoretically and behaviorally to

need for information, and both of these
constructs have been assessed
in previous research through the use of
the Expanded Judgment Task

(Singer and Roby, 1967; Audley, 1964).

If we accept this similarity

for the moment, we obtain three independent
measures of this construct
(which we will call "Information Processing")
one, a subjective one, and a peer rating.

,

including a behavioral

In the same way, question 4

on the impressionistic measures taps the subject's
confidence in

decisions, so we have the same three measures of this
construct.

The multitrait-multimethod matrix which emerges from this data

reduction is presented in Table

6.

Applying the same analyses as in the

preceding case, the following conclusions can be reached.

First, the

convergent validity of the two constructs, as determined by the monotrait-

heteromethod coefficients (enclosed in rectangles)
existent.

,

is virtually non-

As this is the most crucial requirement, there is no real pay-

off in proceeding with further analyses.

We can see, however, that the

high correlation between the peer ratings of Need For Information and

Confidence in Decisions supports our earlier conclusion that there is

considerable methods variance contaminating the results of the peer
rating measures.

It should also be noted that the poor convergent val-

idity here is not surprising or overly significant, given the fact that
single items were extracted from mult i- item measures and used to tap

constructs which they were not specifically designed to tap.

Returning now to the data in Table 4 which generated the general
issue of methods variance, we begin to see the significance of these

methodological considerations. Essentially, it is now possible to say
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that a considerable proportion of the variance accounted
for by the Self

Appraisal and Peer Rating measures is attributable to the methods
employed.

Of course, this is really an indirect conclusion, for it
is

not possible to perform a multitrait-multimethod analysis on all of
the

adjustment measures under consideration.

Yet, the strong relationship

between the self- report decisiveness and adjustment measures, coupled

with the above findings, supports this conclusion.

In order to gain in-

sight into the contribution of methods variance in the relationships

between other adjustment measures and our decisiveness measures, an
additional statistical procedure, regression analysis, can be used.
Because of the importance of this issue to any further interpretation of
the data,

v^e

will present these data now, and then return to our look at

the t-test data and proceed to other results.

Regression analysis

.

One way to address the question of methods

variance is to determine the amount of variance accounted for in a
given adjustment measure by each of the decisiveness measures.

This can

be done through regression analysis, a procedure which finds a linear
combination of independent variables (in our situation, the decisiveness
measures) which correlates as highly as possible with a given dependent
(adjustment) variable.

From this "regression equation" one is able to

obtain information about how the various independent variables relate
to each other and to the dependent variable under consideration.

statistics

The

which supply this information are based on the addition of

A more complete description of these statistics if found in Nie,
Bent, and Hull (1970).
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variables, one at a time, to the regression equation.

In Table 7, the

independent variables are listed in descending order of
importance, with
the first variable accounting for more of the variance
in the adjust-

ment measure than the second, the second more than the third,
and so on.
The first statistic in the table is the Multiple R, which
gives the

correlation between the dependent variable and the regression equation
up to and including the addition of the particular independent variable

under consideration.

The next statistic is more important, the R^, which

can be interpreted as the proportion of variance in the dependent vari-

able which can be accounted for by the independent variables up to and

including the one under consideration.

The R

2

Change statistic refers

to the additional variance accounted for by the addition of that parti-

cular variable to the regression equation.

The Simple R is also important,

for it gives the simple correlation between the particular independent

variable and the dependent variable.

The sign of this statistic or

course must be interpreted in light of scoring pecularities for the

measures involved, as was the case in the t-test data.

Finally, the F

statistic measures the significance of the regression equation representing more than mere chance.

Thus, it gives a sense of the overall utility

of the combination of independent variables going into the regression

equation, in terms of statistically "predicting" the value of the de-

pendent variable.

With this introduction, we can now look at the nine regression
analyses contained in Table
by the previous analyses.

7

in terms of some of the questions raised

As was the case in the t-test data, we

observe that Self Appraisal of Decisiveness is clearly the "strongest"
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TABLE 7
Sumoary of Multiple Regression Data

1. Dependent Vai-lablet General Self Appraisal

VarialDlG

r!

.23

.05
.06
.08
.09
.09
.09

.05

.23

.01
.01
.01
.00
.00

-.10
-.12

.15

.39
-.10

.42

.15
.16
.17
.18
.18

.20
.23
.27
.29
.30
.30

.04
.05
.07
.08
.09
.09

.04
.02
.02

hh

.19
.20
.20
.20
.20
.20

.19
.00
.00
,00
.00
.00

-.44
-.03

.10
.12
.13
.13
.13
.13

.10
.01
.01
.00
.00
.00

-.32
-.16
-.12

Self Appraisal of Decisiveness
Need For Information
Risk Taking
Tendency to Defer Decisions
Confidence in Decisions
Peer Rating of Decisiveness
2,

Dependent Variable

t

2

Multiple R
.25
.28
.30
.30
.30

R

Change

Simple R

F
2.9^*

-.0i^

.03
.08

Self Esteem

Self Appraisal of Decisiveness
Confidence in Decisions
Tendency to Defer Decisions
Peer Rating of Decisiveness
Risk faking

.39
.40

M
AZ

.01
.01
.01
.00

8.14»*

-.14
.15
.04

3. Dependent Variable i Alienation

Self Appraisal of Decisiveness
Confidence in Decisions
Risk Taking
Peer Rating of Decisiveness
Tendency to Defer Decisions
Need For Information

.01
.01
.00

-.20
.14
-.11
-.13
-.10

3.04*

.02

4, Dependent Variable t Anonie

Self Appraisal of Decisiveness
Risk Taking
Confidence in Decisions
Peer Rating of Decisiveness
Need For Information
Tendency to Defer Decisions
5.

M
M

7.79*.*

.07

-.12
.01

.05

Dependent Variable t Depression
Self Appraisal of Decisiveness
Peer Rating of Decisiveness
Confidence in Decisions
Risk Taking
Tendency to Defer Decisions
Need For Information

.32
.34
.36
.36
.36
.36

-.08
.01

.03

^.65»*
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TABLE 7 - Continued

6,

Dependent Variable

t

Variable

ReBonbment
Multiple R

Self Appraisal of Decisiveness
Peer Rating of Deciaiveneso
Need For Information
Tendency to Defer Decisions
Risk Taking
Confidence in Decisions
7.

Dependent Variable

t

rL

R

2

Chaiure

.27
.28
.28
.28
.28
.26

.07
.08
,08
.08
.08
.08

.07
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00

-.27
-.11
.04
.04

.42

.18
.20

.18
.02
. uu
.00

- ,42
- ,22

.07
.10

.07
.03

.11
.11
.11
.11

.01
.00
.00
.00

-.27
-.15
-.07

.25
.28
.28
.29
.29
.29

.25
.03

.50
,26

.01
.01
.00
,00

.09
.03
-.02

2.53*

-.04
.00

Obsessiveness

Self Appraioal of Decisiveness
Peer Rating of Decisiveness
Tendency to Defer Decisions
94.sk Taking

.21
.21

12,05»*

-.03

8. Dependent Variable! Anxiety on Examinations

Self AppicalsAl of Decisiveness
Risk Taking
Confidence in i^ooisions
Tendency to Defer Decisions
Need For Information
Peer Rating of Decisiveness

.27
.32
.33

.34
.34
.34

3.93>**

.12
.03

-.05

9. Dependent Variable! Overall Ad.justment

Self Appraisal of Decisiveness
Peer Rating of Decisiveness
Confidence in Decisions
Risk Taking
Need For Information
Tendency to Defer Decisions

.50
.52
.53

.54
.54
.54

10.6-

-.06

Variables are listed in descending order of Importance.
Multiple R - correlation between dependent variable and all
independent variables added to the regression equation up
to that point.
in
R^ - This can be Interpreted as the proportion of variance
"~
all
by
the dependent variable which can be accounted for
point.
that
to
up
^ independent vai-lables
for by virtue or
R^ Change - The additional variance accounted
variable.
the addition of this particular independent
the particular
between
correlation
simple
This is the
3iMple R
fedipendent variable and the dependent variable. eqmtlon.
regression
F - levS of significance of the entire
particular analysis are stax
Variables which are omitted ftom a
tically insignificant,
p <,001
P < .01

Notes

t
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measure.

That Is. in every case it accounts for a
greater proportion

of the variance in the dependent variable
than any of the other de-

cisiveness measures.

Thus, looking at the values for

and

Change,

we see that Self Appraisal of Decisiveness accounts
for most of the
variance, with the other measures adding little or nothing.

The weight

of Self Appraisal of Decisiveness as opposed to the
other measures is

also supported by the much higher Simple R observed for
this measure in

each of the regressions.

Finally, the F statistics indicate that the

probability of accounting for this amount of variance in the dependent
measures by "chance" is less than one in a hundred for all regressions.
Given the fact that Self Appraisal of Decisiveness accounts for
almost all of the variance in these self report adjustment measures, the

existence of considerable methods variance is again suggested.

These

regression data can be used to tell us approximately how much methods

variance is involved by simply subtracting the actual variance accounted
for by Self Appraisal of Decisiveness from the total variance accounted

for by all of the adjustment measures.

This operation results in a

determination of the variance attributable to the behavioral and peer
rating measures, which can be considered as true, non-methods variance

because of the nature of these instruments.

Thus, subtracting R

Self Appraisal of Decisiveness from the total R

2

2

for

figure in each regression,

we observe the remaining non-methods variance to range from a low of 1%
for anomie and resentment to a high of 5% for alienation.

Of course,

these figures are based on the assumption that all of the variance

accounted for by Self Appraisal of Decisiveness is attributable to methods
factors.

However, considering the high degree of convergent validity and
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the adequate discriminant validity shovm
in Table 5 for the self-appraisals

of decisiveness and performance, it is
reasonable to infer that Self

Appraisal of Decisiveness accounts for at least
as much "true" variance
as the non-self-report measures.

This suggests that 1 to 5 percent of

the Self Appraisal of Decisiveness variance is also
non-contaminated.

Indeed, this figure is probably a bit higher in view of
the fact signi-

ficant "true" correlations are theoretically expected
between Self

Appraisal of Decisiveness and the other indices of decisiveness,
so
some degree of "shared" correlation with the dependent
variables is to

be expected.

Also, the fact that the self and peer ratings of decisive-

ness relate to virtually the same adjustment measures suggests some "true"

relationship between Self Appraisal of Decisiveness and the adjustment

measures
Taking all of the methods variance data into consideration we can
conclude that methods variance is indeed responsible for much of the

relationship between Self Appraisal of Decisiveness and the self-report
adjustment measures, as well as the relationship between Peer Rating of
Decisiveness and Peer Rating of Performance.

Our data are not sufficient

to arrive at an accurate determination of the amount of methods vari-

ance, but it seems reasonable to infer that at the very minimum 1 to 5

percent (and probably more) of the variance common to Self Appraisal of

Decisiveness and the dependent variables is "true" or valid.

Of course,

the other behavioral measures of decisiveness and the peer rating are

not vulnerable to this problem, given their objective nature.

The significance of the above conclusion clearly requires further
discussion, especially in relation to interpreting the overall results
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presented in Table

4.

Before proceeding with this discussion,
however,

it would be useful to consider additional
data which may also be vulner-

able to methods variance contamination.

After this data is considered

we can more effectively integrate our results
in a general discussion.

Additional Analyses

Careful judgments have to be made about additional
analyses, for
the data analysis can become overwhelming with little
additional payoff.

For example, we have been using the total score for the
Tendency to Defer

Decisions instrument, despite evidence of poor test validity.

One

option, therefore, is to consider each dimension of this instrument

separately as a unique factor, and perform the same tests we have just

presented all over again on these new factors.

Indeed, one could extend

this argument further by factor analyzing all of the items which con-

stitute our decisiveness measures and generating a new set of "independent

measures" based on these factor loadings.

While this may appear to be

going to an extreme, because of the particular questions raised by

previous analyses this procedure was used.

In so doing, we can further

establish the validity of our measures, and, pertaining to the question
of methods variance, establish if the self-report measure of decisiveness
is truly distinct and independent of what we have been calling our be-

havioral and peer rating measures.
Factor analysis of all independent variables .

These data are dif-

ficult to reproduce in their entirety because of the large number of

variables involved, but a summary of these data is contained in Table
which gives the composition and "weight" of each of the major factors
and the correlations between these factors.

8,
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TABLE 8

Summary of Factor Analysis of All Decisiveness Measures

Factor
I

%

Var.

Cum. % Var

15.6

II

Factor Loadings

15.6

Peer Rating of Decisiveness (items l,2,3,i|,7)

30.1

Need For Information (trials 1,2,3)

III

10.8

M.o

Self Appraisal of Decisiveness (items 1,2,3.4)

IV

8.9

49.8

Self Appraisal of Decisiveness (items 5»6)

V

8.3

58.1

Confidence In Decisions (trials 1,2,3)

VI

7.9

66.0

Risk Taking (items 1,2,3,4,5,10,12)

VII

5.1

71.1

Peer Rating of Decisiveness (items 5f6)

Risk Taking (items 6,8,ll) on Factor VIII,
no clear pattern on remaining factors.

100.0

VIII-XVI (5.0)

Factor Pattern Correlations

Factors
I

II

III

IV
V
VI

VII

VIII

I

1.00

II

HI

IV

.01

.12

-.05

1.00

-.03
1.00

VI

VII

VIII

-.02

-.02

-.03

-.03

-.04

-.19

.14

.03

.14

.04

.11

.04

-.02

-.08

1.00

-.03

-.05

-.20

.12

1.00

-.09

-.02

-.07

1.00

.08

.10

1.00

-.02

V

1.00
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Recalling the composition of the various measures
of decisiveness,
we note from Table 8 that all of the items from
Peer Rating of Decisive-

ness load on Factor I, the three trials in Need
For Information load on

Factor II, and all of the items contained in Self
Appraisal of Decisiveness except for item

7

load on Factor III, and that these three factors

account for most of the important variance.

tional useful information emerges.

Looking further, some addi-

The next five factors, with each

accounting for five to nine percent of the variance, are made
up of other

major independent measures as initially constituted, or parts thereof.
Thus, the "omitted items" from the Self Appraisal of Decisiveness and

Peer Rating of Decisiveness scales make up two factors (Factors IV and
VII)

,

Confidence in Decisions makes up Factor V, and most of the items

from Risk Taking represent Factors VI and VIII.

Thus, we see that even

if we disregard the grouping of items according to the construction of

our measures, five of the six decisiveness measures do emerge as major
factors.

The sixth. Tendency to Defer Decisions, is again seen to

present a problem, in that its items do not load on any major factors.
However, this analysis enables us to conclude that further analyses

based upon any minor factors which TDD does load on would probably not
yield strong results, for only a very small amount of variance could

possibly be accounted for.
There is additional information of interest in Table
of correlation patterns among the various major factors.

8 in the form

The correla-

tion of .12 between Factor I (Peer Rating of Decisiveness) and Factor III
(Self Appraisal of Decisiveness) is expected given our earlier correla-

tional data.

We might note here that this correlation between the peer
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rating and self-appraisal measures, coupled
with our earlier finding
that both of these measures relate to many
adjustment measures, supports
the view that the self-appraisal results
are not completely attributable
to response bias.

This will be discussed in detail in the
next chapter.

The relatively strong correlation between Factor
II (Need For Information) and Factor V (Confidence in Decisions) is
also expected.

Factor II

also correlates with Factors VI and VII, which
represent the two major

parts of the Risk Taking instrument.

Taken together, these data support

our earlier conclusion that there is a correlation
between the various

behavioral, task-oriented instruments, but that there is not
a correlation between the behavioral and impressionistic instruments.

This

point should also be noted because it supports the methodological
dis-

tinction between the task-oriented and impressionistic measures, a distinction which is central to our interpretation of methods variance.
An unexpected finding which emerges in this table is the correlation

between Factors IV and VII, which include the two omitted items from
both of the seven-item self-appraisal and peer rating decisiveness
measures.
difficult.

These items ask whether "big" or "small" decisions are more
The fact that they correlate with each other again suggests

some objective (peer rating) validation of the self-appraisal measure, and
the fact that they emerge as factors which account for a significant

portion of the total variance (14%) suggests that additional analyses
using these four items may be fruitful.

Looking at these four items, a series of correlation coefficients

pairing each of them with the major adjustment measures was obtained.
The following significant results were observed:
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1)

Question 5 from Self Appraisal of Decisiveness correlated
with
four adjustment measures, Including Self-esteem
(p <. .01),
Alienation (p < .01), Anomle (p <.005), and Depression
(p < .05).
All correlations Indicated that subjects who had more
difficulty
with small decisions did not do as well on the
adjustment measures,
reporting less Self-esteem and more Alienation, Anomle,
and
Depression.

2)

Question 6 from Self Appraisal of Decisiveness also correlated
significantly with four measures, Obsessiveness
(p < .005),
Math SAT (p< .01), Anomle (p < .05) and Anxiety on Exams
Subjects who reported that big decisions are more
(p < .001).
difficult than small ones had lower Math SAT scores and higher
Obsessiveness, Anomle, and Anxiety scores.

3)

Question 5 from Peer Rating of Decisiveness correlated with
five adjustment measures as follows:
subjects who were judged
to have more difficulty with small decisions than big ones
reported lower Self-esteem (p < .05), more Anomle (p < .005),
Depression (p < .05) and Resentment (p < .05), and also were
given lower ratings by their peers on the five "general performance" in social and academic life questions (p < .01).

4)

Question 6 from Peer Rating of Decisiveness (asking if the
subject has more difficulty with big decisions than small ones)
did not correlate with any of the major adjustment scores.

These results will be discussed in the next chapter, but we again note
that response bias must be considered as a factor in the two self-report

questions.
At the same time that these separate analyses for the omitted items

from the self- appraisal and peer rating decisiveness measures were performed, we also looked at the Risk Taking instrument from the perspective

of its separate factors.

We could have partitioned this scale in several

different ways, basing the partition either on the factor analysis done

earlier just for that scale, or on the larger factor analysis done on all
of the decisiveness items.

It was decided to fucus on the latter, for

the factor loadings were more clear-cut and the fact that they were

generated from a much larger pool of variables suggests that these

72

factors may represent a more realistic grouping
of items.

from Table 8 that items

1.

2,

3.

4. 5,

Thus, we see

10. and 12 all fall on one factor

(which we can call RTl) and items 6, 8, and 11 fall
on another major

factor (RT2)

.

Tlie

correlation coefficients relating each of these

factors to our major adjustment measures yielded the
following results:
1)

RTl correlated with only one major adjustment measure.
Alienation (p < .05), with high RTl (high decisive) subjects
reporting less alienation.

2)

RT2 correlated with only one major adjustment measure.
Depression
(p < .05), with high RT2 (high decisive) subjects reporting
more depression (contrary to prediction)

3)

RTl correlated fairly well with RT2 (r- .32, p < .001), and
both RTl and RT2 correlated very strongly with the original
RT total scale (r=.87 and .67, respectively, p< .001).
Thus, it is not surprising that factor analyzing this measure
did not produce significantly more results.

On the basis of these data we may conclude that our original decision
to use the total Risk Taking instrument was valid.

These analyses conclude the survey of the relationship between in-

dividual decisiveness measures and the adjustment measures.

There is

another approach which may shed light on these relationships, namely the

addition of the "control" variables of sex, religion, class, and college
major.

Relation of the decisiveness and adjustment measures to the control

variables

.

In order to assess whether such an approach would be useful,

a number of simple correlation coefficients were obtained, relating each

of these control variables to each of the major decisiveness and adjust-

ment measures.

These rather extensive data will not be reproduced here,

for in themselves they do not tell us a great deal.

However, we can say

that each of the control variables was observed to correlate significantly
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with at least a few of the major adjustment and
decisiveness measures,
indicating that there may be some interaction between
the control variables and the decisiveness measures as they relate
to the adjustment

measures
On the other hand, we must also realize that the "simple"
relationships which were observed without regard to the control variables
were

not particularly strong, so there is no way to predict whether much
will

be gained by performing a series of multi-factored analyses of variance
to test for these interactions.

Thus, the only real way to determine

the effect of the control variables is to actually run the tests.
It is impractical to reproduce the entire series, for we have six

decisiveness measures which can interact with as many as fifteen adjustment measures and four control variables, for a total of 360 separate
analyses of variance.

Another important consideration to keep in mind

in selecting which analyses to present is the actual number of significant

analyses observed for a given control variable.

With the large number

of analyses involved, we would expect a certain number of significant

results to occur just by chance.

Thus, we will adopt the minimum criterion

for significance used throughout this paper (which of course works in the

"reverse" in this instance) and ignore anything less than a figure of 5%

significant Interactions for a given control variable.

With 90 analyses

for each control variable (6 decisiveness measures X 15 adjustment

measures)

,

this translates into a needed minimum of four or five signi-

ficant interactions.

As it turned out, the only control variable which

yielded four or more significant Interactions with the decisiveness
measures was Sex.

In the other cases, less than this number were observed.
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so we see these data do not meet our criterion
for significance, and

therefore will not be presented.
The design which was used for the analyses involving
Sex and the

decisiveness measures was a 2x2 factorial analysis, with
one of the

decisiveness measures (extreme groupings were used) as one factor,
and
Sex as the second factor.

A different adjustment measure served as the

dependent variable for each analysis.

Nine significant interactions were

observed, so we can easily summarize these data, looking individually
at significant interactions for each of the decisiveness measures.

We

will ignore significant "main effects," for these were dealt with in our
t-test data.
1)

Need For Information and Sex interacted significantly (p < .05)
in two instances, Anomie and General Self Appraisal, with
decisive males and indecisive females reporting greater Anomie,
and decisive females and indecisive males reporting higher
General Self Appraisal. Thus, it appears that decisive females report better adjustment on these measures than decisive
males, and indecisive males report better adjustment than
indecisive females.

2)

Confidence in Decisions and Sex interacted significantly
(p < .05) in the case of Peer Rating of Performance, with high
decisive males receiving higher ratings than high decisive
females, and low decisive females receiving better ratings than
low decisive males. Thus, in this case indecisive females and
decisive males perform better than their opposite-sex counterparts.

3)

Risk Taking and Sex interacted in the case of General Self
Appraisal (p < .05), with high decisive females reporting a
better self appraisal than high decisive males, and no significant difference between males and females in the low
decisive category.

4)

Tendency to Defer Decision and Sex interacted significantly
(p < .05) in the case of General Self Appraisal, with the
same results reported for Risk Taking above.

5)

Self Appraisal of Decisiveness did not interact with Sex.
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6)

Peer Rating of Decisiveness and Sex
interacted at the same
level of significance (p
< .05) on four adjustment measures:
Obsessiveness, Anxiety on Exams. Resentment,
and Peer Rating
^^^^^ instances, females in the
^^"^
^T""^-group did
high decisive
"better" (i.e., less obsessiveness.
less anxious, less resentment) than the males,
while in the
low decisive group males did better than
females.
In the
case of Peer Rating of Performance, the opposite
was true,
with high decisive males receiving better peer
ratings than
females, and low decisive females receiving
better ratings
than low decisive males.

While we have been postponing a general discussion of
results
until the next chapter, the complexity of these data makes
it advisable
to mention two general observations at this point.

First, unlike much

of the preceding data, the above results are not vulnerable
to the con-

tamination of methods variance, for only the objective measures of

decisiveness are involved.

Second, a careful look at the above results

reveals that in every case in which an adjustment measure was based on
a self appraisal, high decisive females rated themselves "better" than

low decisive females, and low decisive males rated themselves "better"
than high decisive males.

On the other hand, in those instances where

the dependent measure was based on peer ratings of the subjects, males

who are "high decisive" were rated better than females, and females who
are "low decisive" were rated better than males.

The theoretical and

"socio-political" implications of this unexpected finding will be discussed in the next chapter.

Relationship between decisiveness and other adjustment measures

.

Thus far we have been restricting our data analysis to what we have

been calling th6 "major" adjustment measures, meaning those selfreport and behavioral measures which tap the subjects' general psycho-

logical adjustment and ability to function academically and interpersonally
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In addition to these data we also have
information on other areas which

relate to adjustment, but which must be handled by
different statistical
procedures.

These measures all take the form of "yes-no"
responses to

specific questions, and thus cannot be handled by t-tests
or analyses
of variance.

Instead, a series of 2x2 tables was generated, dividing

subjects into four categories according to both their decisiveness
score
on a particular measure and their response on one of these
adjustment
questions.

The Chi Square statistic indicates if there are significant

differences in the numbers of subjects falling into each category.

The

specific questions involved in these analyses are whether the subject
uses drugs to cope with stress, whether he complains of physical symptoms

associated with stress, whether he participates in extracurricular and
athletic activities, and whether he plans to seek, or has already sought,

psychological guidance.
Of the 24 analyses in this series, three significant relationships

were observed (12%, an acceptable figure), but as in the preceding results
involving self-report measures, much of these relationships may be

attributable to response bias.

It was found that fewer subjects who

scored high in Confidence in Decisions reported physical symptoms
(p

<.01).

Similarly, fewer subjects falling into the high decisive

group on Self Appraisal of Decisiveness reported physical symptoms
(p

<

.01) and interest in seeking psychological guidance (p

These data are all in the predicted direction.

<

.01).
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CHAPTER

IV

DISCUSSION

As mentioned in the Introduction, this investigation is not con-

cerned with the question of whether indecisiveness "causes" maladjustment, or conversely with the question of whether being decisive is a

prerequisite to psychological health.

Rather, it is concerned with a

phenomenological or experiential relationship between decisiveness and
adjustment, stemming from the theoretical link between the feeling of

being competent and the feeling of being able to make decisions.

Thus,

our hypothesis is descriptive or correlational, not causal.

What, then, can we say about the nature of decisiveness and its

relationship to psychological adjustment?

As in the case of our presen-

tation of results, we must approach this question in a systematic way,
for there is a great deal of data which must be integrated and inter-

preted.

Therefore, we will follow the same logical outline employed

earlier, beginning with a look at decisiveness itself, and then moving

on to a look at its relationship to psychological adjustment.
The Nature of Decisiveness

The following discussion of decisiveness, quite obviously, is

based on a very limited number of measures which are designed to tap
specific aspects of the decision-making process.

One can thus legiti-

all about
mately wonder if our data justify making any statements at

"decisiveness" per se.

Indeed, a conservative approach would be to

"need for informake no statements about decisiveness, but only about

"risk taking behavior
mation as measured by the Expanded Judgment Task,"
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as measured by the Choice Dilemma Questionnaire," and so on.

In a

strict sense, of course, this conservative approach is the only truly

defensible one, for one can never be "sure" that a particular instrument
taps what (and only what) it is designed to tap.

For the purposes of

this investigation, however, it is both useful and justifiable to adopt
a less conservative approach, for the following reasons.

First, and most importantly, this investigation has defined

"decisiveness" according to a number of operational and phenomenological
dimensions, so any statement we make about decisiveness is implicitly

contingent on our definition of decisiveness.

Ultimately, then, it is

the definition itself which must be defended, rather than the indirect

relationship between our instruments and the construct of decisiveness.
The defense for our definition of decisiveness is contained in the

theoretical discussion and the supporting empirical research cited in
the Introduction.

The crucial point, however, is that this investigation

is not primarily concerned with validating our definition of decisiveness,

but rather with examining the relationship between decisiveness as we

define it and psychological adjustment.

Whether or not our definition

of decisiveness is a good one is reflected In the nature of the results

obtained on the basis of that definition.
The above rationale is contingent on each of our measures actually

tapping the specific dimension it is designed to tap.

That is, we have

decisiveargued that our six dimensions can be considered as aspects of
these dimensions,
ness because we have defined decisiveness according to
tap these
but it is important to consider if our measures actually

dimensions.

There are several ways to address this matter.

Perhaps the
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strongest point is that the face validity of each of our instruments is

extremely high.

For example, in Need For Information, the measure con-

sists of a direct assessment of the amount of information required in
an actual decision-making task.
of the other behavioral measures.

The same operational validity is true
The two impressionistic measures have

equally high face validity, for the two constructs are defined in terms
of impressionistic assessments.
In addition to the high face validity of the measures, the test

and construct validity of the measures can be addressed by our data

analysis.

This, of course, is precisely the purpose of this section

of the chapter, for by examining the validity and interrelationship

of our decisiveness measures we hope to learn something about the

nature of decisiveness as defined in this research.
We observed good test validity for five of the six decisiveness
measures, which suggests that each is tapping a homogeneous variable.

These measures include Need For Information, Confidence in Decisions,

Risk Taking, Self Appraisal of Decisiveness, and Peer Rating of Decisiveness.

The sixth measure. Tendency to Defer Decisions, appears to be

multidimensional.

Further, the significant (but relatively low) correla-

tions between the four task-oriented measures suggest that the dimensions of decisiveness they tap are related to each other.

However, the

relationships are not strong enough to indicate a monolithic trait of
decisiveness.

Rather, our data suggest that decisiveness itself is a

multidimensional construct.

This conclusion is supported by the ob-

servation that the two impressionistic measures correlate with each
other, but not with the behavioral measures.

In addition, the fact that

most of the measures emerged virtually intact after a comprehensive
factor analysis as distinct factors indicates the multidimensionality
of decisiveness as reflected in our measures.
It is difficult to specify the nature of the various dimensions
of decisiveness in a general way, for each of our measures is quite

specific.

However, the pattern of relationships among the decisiveness

measures sheds light on this matter.

As noted in Chapter II, our

decisiveness measures can be categorized in two ways.

First, they can

be classified according to the format for data collection.

Thus, we

have four task-oriented, behavioral instruments, and two global, im-

pressionistic instruments.

Secondly, they can be classified according

to their degree of objectivity.

In this case, the four behavioral

measures are objective in that they are based on performance in a
decision-making situation rather than on the self-appraisal of the
subject, and the peer rating measure is objective in that someone other

than the subject is responding.

Now, given these two classifications

and the pattern of relationships described above, the following con-

clusions can be made:

(1), decision-making behavior of various sorts

of inforis relatively homogeneous in that specific behaviors (amount

mation demanded, risk taking, and so on) correlate with each other;
of one's own decision(2), an impressionistic or subjective assessment

actual permaking ability does not necessarily correlate with one's

self-appraisal
formance in decision-making situations, and (3), one's

with the assessment
of his decision-making ability does tend to agree
of an observer.

for
However, each of these points must be qualified,

even when significant.
the observed correlations are fairly low,

Thus

81

the picture of decisiveness which emerges from these data is not one of
a circumscribed, homogeneous trait, but of a rather diffuse, hetero-

geneous construct in which some correlation between its various com-

ponents exists.

After confirming the test validity of the various measures of

psychological adjustment, a systematic analysis of the relationship

between the decisiveness measures and the adjustment measures was done,
from which we can now draw some conclusions.
The Relationship of Decisiveness to Psychological Adjustment

A preliminary series of t-tests using extreme groupings (upper and
lower quartiles) for each of the decisiveness measures afforded a picture
of how each of the decisiveness measures related to each of the adjust-

ment measures.

The two Impressionistic measures. Self Appraisal of

Decisiveness and Peer Rating of Decisiveness, were observed to yield

more significant t-scores than any of the other measures.

This suggests

either the actual "superiority" of an impressionistic assessment of

decisiveness in terms of its relationship to psychological adjustment,
or methods contamination in the self-report measures of decisiveness

and adjustment.

Of course, a third possibility is that our data contain

both methods and non-methods variance.

In fact, it will now be demon-

strated that this third alternative embodies the most realistic interpretation of our data.
The purely statistical evidence contained in the multitrait-

multlmethod analyses and in the regression analyses suggest that a
significant portion of the relationship between the self-report decisiveness and adjustment measures is attributable to methods variance or
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response bias.

This evidence is based on the observation that the

correlations between the same measure of different traits are approximately equal to or in some cases higher than the correlations between

different measures of the same trait

.

The implication here is that

how a trait is measured is more important than what the trait is.
This large amount of response bias is not surprising in view of what
is known about individual differences in styles of self-presentation.

However, while it is difficult to specify precisely how much variance
is attributable to response bias, we can be certain that it is not all

response bias.

That is, by comparison to other results that cannot be

distorted by response bias, we conclude that the relation between self-

appraised decisiveness and various adjustment measures is low but surely
significant.

For example, five of our decisiveness measures are ob-

jective either because they are based on specific tasks or because of
the source of the data.

Thus, any relationship between one of these

measures and the self-report adjustment measures is not vulnerable to

contamination due to response bias.

Now, the correlation between Self

Appraisal of Decisiveness and Peer Rating of Decisiveness suggests that
they tap
the global, impressionistic dimension of decisiveness which

has some construct validity.

In addition, the fact that both of these

suggests that
measures relate to virtually the same adjustment measures
of methods factors
the self-appraisals cannot be completely a function

or response bias.

Self
In fact, it would be reasonable to infer that

to adjustment
Appraisal of Decisiveness relates at least as strongly
as does Peer Rating of Decisiveness.

If this is the case, then we

relationship between Self Appraisal
deduce that the strength of the true
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of Decisiveness and the adjustment measures, excluding methods variance,
is at least as strong as the relationship between Peer Rating of Decisive-

ness and adjustment.

Taken together, then, our data support the view that the results
involving Self Appraisal of Decisiveness, which appear at first to be
the strongest results, are actually partially a function of extraneous

methods factors.

A final point concerns the significance of this con-

clusion for the present investigation.

While many studies would be

quite seriously challenged by evidence for so much methods variance,
the nature of this investigation is such that the impact is lessened.

This stems from our theoretical emphasis on the phenomenological rela-

tionship between decisiveness and adjustment, as opposed to a causal
one.

Thus, it is not being claimed that decisiveness is a specific

trait which "causes" the development of other traits which indicate

psychological adjustment.

Rather, the experiential or subjective com-

ponents of decisiveness and adjustment are considered to be closely
related to each other.

In terms of our data this means that even if

the relationship between Self Appraisal of Decisiveness and adjustment
is due entirely to response bias, our theoretical link between the two

receives some support.
Apart from the fact that the two impressionistic measures of

decisiveness relate to far more adjustment measures than the behavioral
instruments, other patterns emerge from the data in Table

4.

For

example. Need For Information, which is based on an actual decision-

making task, relates to only three measures of performance, and each of
these measures is a behavioral measure (Verbal SAT, Math SAT, and Peer

Rating of Performance).

This is not to suggest the possibility of

methods contamination, for the two SAT measures are quite
different
from the Expanded Judgment Task and the Peer Rating is
inherently objective.

Rather, this pattern seems to suggest that the behavioral

components of decisiveness relate mostly to behavioral constructs.

~

Similarly, we observe that Confidence in Decisions

a subjective

appraisal of one's performance on an objective task

~

strongly with Self-esteem, Alienation, and Anomie.

This makes sense

correlates most

in that one would expect a person who is confident in himself to think

"better" of himself and also to feel either less dependent on others
(and hence less subject to feeling alienated) or less dependent on norms
to guide his behavior (hence, less anomie).

It does not necessarily

follow that high confidence would relate in the same way to the other

adjustment measures, although it must be admitted that we would have

expected it to do so from our theoretical emphasis on the importance
of one's feeling that he can take effective action.

Thus, our data

suggest that the relationship between confidence in one's decisions and

adjustment is much more specific to particular aspects of adjustment
than we had expected.

Risk Taking related significantly to Anxiety on Exams and the four
"General Self Appraisal" items which tap the subject's impression of

how well he thinks he is doing in academic and social life.

In the

case of Anxiety on Exams, high risk taking subjects reported lower
anxiety.

This may be understood in the context of the link between

risk taking and perceived ability described in Jellison and Rlsklnd
(1970) and which is also considered in the Introduction.

Persons who
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perceive themselves as having high ability choose to take risks to

demonstrate this ability, and taking an examination is such a "risk."
In terms of decisiveness, this translates into the individual's per-

ception that he is capable of making decisions, so he is more comfortable
in a situation in which he can demonstrate this ability.

In the case

of General Self Appraisal, however, results indicate that high risk

(high decisive) subjects report lower self-appraisals.

This is not

consistent with the view that risk taking corresponds to perceived
ability.

One possible explanation for this is that high risk individuals

might be willing to assxime risks because they are not as committed to
success as individuals who demand great certainty.

Thus, if high risk

individuals are not committed to success, it follows that they would not
be as motivated to have a high self appraisal.

Of course, this is all

post hoc speculation, and all that we are really justified in saying is
that our results with the Risk Taking dimension are disappointing and

conflicting.
Finally, the results observed for Tendency to Defer Decisions in

Table 4 cluster around adjustment and performance measures which intuitively relate to accepting responsibility for decisions and one's actions
in general:

self-esteem, alienation, taking examinations, academic

performance, and obsessiveness.

A person who chooses to make his own

decisions is likely to think highly of himself, not require a great
deal of social support, accept responsibility for academic work and

examinations, and not be obsessive about decisions.

The fact that low

Tendency to Defer subjects report lower Verbal SAT scores is difficult
report higher
to understand, as is the fact that these same subjects
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Grade Point Averages and less Anxiety on Exams.

Given the consistency

of the other results observed for this measure, it is
probable that the

relationship with Verbal SAT is spurious or contaminated by the very
rough averaging procedure which was used in the coding of these data
(scores were rounded to the nearest "hundred" for both Verbal and Math
SAT).

The above interpretations of the t-test data lead to two important

observations.

First, virtually all of the significant results which

were observed are in the predicted direction

—

decisive individuals

are better adjusted and perform better in a variety of situations.
Second, the relationship between decisiveness and adjustment is much

less general than expected, with particular dimensions of decisiveness

relating only to particular dimensions of adjustment which are similar
to each other in terms of the type of behavior they tap.

Thus, the

impressionistic measures of decisiveness tend to relate to subjective
components of adjustment (self-esteem, depression, resentment, and so
on)

,

the behavioral measures of decisiveness tend to relate to actual

performance variables, confidence in one's decisions relates to dimensions

which tap one's sense of self worth and independence, and so on.

A more

general observation is that the impressionistic measures of decisiveness relate to more components of adjustment than any of the other

measures, which lends support to our theoretical emphasis on the phenom-

enological approach to decisiveness.

Of course, all of these points take

into account the fact that the strength of the relationships involving
the self- appraisal instruments is diminished due to methods variance.
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In addition to these conclusions based upon the
t-test data, other

analyses yield useful information.

It was found that the items omitted

from the total Self Appraisal of Decisiveness and Peer Rating
of Decisiveness scales (asking whether big or small decisions are more
difficult)

emerged as significant measures of decisiveness in our factor analysis
of all measures, accounting for 14% of the variance.

Looking at the

relationship between these items and the various adjustment and performance measures, it was found that those subjects who reported that
small decisions were more difficult also reported less self-esteem and

greater alienation, anomie, and depression.

Subjects who reported that

big decisions were more difficult reported lower Math SAT scores and
higher obsessiveness, anomie, and anxiety on examinations.
the exception of anomie (which relates to both items)

,

Thus, with

feeling that

small decisions are more difficult seems to relate to how one sees

oneself (self-esteem, depression, alienation), while feeling that big

decisions are more difficult seems to relate to confident performance
(Math SAT, obsessiveness, anxiety on examinations).

In the case of

anomie, one may speculate that decision-making difficulty of either sort

relates to feeling a lack of norms to guide behavior.

We might there-

fore summarize these data by saying that the person who cannot make big

decisions is less able to function effectively, the person who cannot
make small decisions takes it out on himself, and problems with decisions
of either sort generate a feeling that one has no guidelines upon which
to base one's behavior.

We also see support here for our observation

that particular aspects of decisiveness relate to particular aspects of

adjustment.
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The remaining data stemming from the factor analysis of all
deci-

siveness measures concerns the two dominant factors of the Risk
Taking
instrument and the test validity of the Tendency to Defer Decisions
instrument.

Little was gained from an analysis of the relationship

between the two Risk Taking factors and the adjustment measures, which
is understandable given the high correlations between these factors and

between each factor and the total Risk Taking instrument.
validity of the original Risk Taking measure is supported.

Thus, the test

The results

for the Tendency to Defer Decisions instrument, however, were quite

different, for the items on this measure did not emerge as significant
factors in accounting for the variance in all of the decision-making
items.

Further, the factor analysis of this scale alone yielded five

distinct factors with each accounting for a relatively large proportion
of the variance.

Thus, this measure is both multidimensional and rather

weak as an indicator of decisiveness.

Yet, in using the total ten-item

scale, several significant relationships with the adjustment measures were

observed, and these relationships were shown (in the above discussion) to

make intuitive and theoretical sense.

We may therefore speculate that,

while there are serious problems with the particular version of the
scale used in this research, it still makes sense to consider "tendency
to defer decisions" as an aspect of decisiveness.

Clearly, further

research using this dimension is in order, particularly in terms of

generating additional versions of the scale using a greater number of
items from which content-specific aspects of "tendency to defer decisions"

can be derived.

Looking next at the effect of the control variables on the

relationship between the decisiveness and
adjustment measures, we

observed sex was the only factor which
interacted with decisiveness.

When an observed significant interaction
was based on an adjustment
variable involving a self-appraisal, high decisive
females rated themselves "better" than low decisive females, while
low decisive males

rated themselves better than high decisive males.

Conversely, in the

case of peer ratings of the subjects, high decisive
males were rated

better than low decisive males and low decisive females
were rated

better than high decisive females.

Given these data, one can derive

interesting theoretical and socio-political implications.

Decisiveness

in males is a valuable trait from the perspective of others,
and in-

decisiveness in females is similarly "valued."

On the other hand, this

"external value system" is not congruent with one's "internal value
system," for indecisive males rate themselves better than decisive
males, and decisive females rate themselves better than indecisive
females.

This, of course, is ignoring the observation that when sex

is not taken into consideration, decisiveness tends to relate to

better adjustment by both the subjects themselves and by peers.

However,

on the basis of these data we may speculate that a "compensation effect"
is operating, in which an individual will tend to value in himself a

trait which he has, even though the opposite trait is valued by others,

thereby (perhaps) counteracting the fact that one does not conform to

expectations.

The data for the females are particularly interesting

from this perspective given the present day "women's movement."

The only additional analyses yet to be discussed involve those

adjustment measures which are based on "yes-no" responses to specific
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questions.

As we saw, the results observed were all in the
predicted

direction, with fewer subjects who were high in Confidence
in Decisions

reporting physical symptoms associated with stress, and fewer
subjects
falling into the high decisive group on Self Appraisal of
Decisiveness

reporting physical symptoms and interest in seeking psychological
guidance.

As was noted in our presentation of these data, these results

can be attributed to response bias.

However, our earlier discussion of

methods variance suggests that some true relationship may be contained
in all of the relationships between the self-report measures, especially

given the theoretical correlation between the dimensions these measures
tap.

Also, even if these results are completely due to response bias,

we still can conclude that persons who claim to be decisive in terms
of the particular measures under consideration also claim fewer physical

symptoms and less need for psychological guidance.

Thus, whether or

not one's actual decision-making ability relates to adjustment, we see
that an individual's perception of his decision-making ability relates
to his perception of his psychological adjustment.
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CHAPTER

V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The fundamental theoretical position of this research
can be

fonnulated quite simply, and all of our findings relate
directly to
this theoretical position.

Stated most concisely, a person copes with

the normal stresses of life to the extent that he feels himself
capable

of taking effective action to deal with the particular stress.

Four

areas of psychological theory were presented in support of this position, and this research attempts to integrate these positions and
take

them a step further.

This theoretical step was taken by postulating

that the ability to make decisions is the most important observable

manifestation of the ability to take action.

Thus, a theoretical link

between decisiveness and psychological adjustment was postulated.
In order to investigate decisiveness, the literature on decision-

making was examined and the major components of decisiveness were
defined.

A number of instruments designed

to tap these dimensions of

decisiveness were administered to a large number of undergraduate
students, along with some measures of psychological adjustment and

performance in school and other areas of daily life.

The major hypothesis

which guided this investigation was that decisive individuals show
better psychological adjustment and a higher level of performance than
indecisive ones.

A phenomeno logical or experiential approach is implicit

in this hypothesis, in that the relationship between decisiveness and

adjustment was considered in correlational, rather than causal, terms.
Thus, the experience of decisiveness is closely related to psychological
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adjustment in a functional way.

Also implicit in this hypothesis is
the

premise that the various dimensions of decisiveness
correlate with each
other.

The results showed good test validity for five of
our six decisiveness measures, but relatively few significant relationships
between the

decisiveness measures and the adjustment measures.

Further, it was seen

that a large amount of response bias or methods variance
contaminated

the relationship between our most powerful measure, Self
Appraisal of

Decisiveness, and the adjustment measures.

However, it was shown that

response bias could not explain all of the strong correlation
between
Self Appraisal of Decisiveness and adjustment, and the hypothesized

relation between the two was confirmed.

This Inference was based largely

on the observed correlation between the self-appraisal and peer ratings
of decisiveness, and the observation that these two measures related
to the adjustment measures in very similar ways.

Hence, while response

bias attenuates the results for Self Appraisal of Decisiveness to some
extent, the validity of the hypothesized relation between decisiveness

and adjustment cannot be denied.

The patterns of significant relationships which were observed
suggest that decisiveness is a multidimensional trait, with the various

dimensions bearing some relationship to each other, and that the relationship between decisiveness and adjustment is not a general one, but

rather a function of the particular dimension under consideration.
Thus, the impressionistic measures of decisiveness tend to relate to

subjective components of adjustment, the behavioral measures of decisive-

ness tend to relate to actual performance variables, confidence in one's
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decisions relates to dimensions which
tap one's sense of self worth
and
Independence, and so on.

Finally, the fact that the two
Impressionistic

measures were related to more adjustment
measures than any other measure
of decisiveness supports our theoretical
position that a phenomenologlcal
or experiential relationship between
decisiveness and adjustment Is

stronger than a behavioral or empirical one.

While this Investigation does shed light on
the nature of decisiveness and Its relationship to psychological
adjustment, many questions

remain which merit further research.

In terms of this particular study,

the most Important question concerns the fact that
our data were In-

sufficient to make an accurate determination of the
extent to which

methods factors are responsible for our results In some crucial
areas.
Further research could address this question by developing a
method-

ology In which every dimension of decisiveness Is measured by at
least
two independent methods.

In a more general sense, one must note that

our conclusions are based on a number of specific laboratory measures

which were administered to a relatively homogeneous group of students
who were motivated to participate by receiving course credits.

Further

research using more realistic decision-making situations and a more

heterogeneous population would certainly broaden our understanding of the

relationship between decisiveness and psychological adjustment.

Perhaps

the most important conclusion which emerges from the present investigation
is that such a comprehensive study is justified, for while our specific

conclusions are limited by methodological factors, the existence of a

relationship between decisiveness and adjustment is supported.
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APPENDIX

The questionnaires on the following pages are
identical to those used
in this research, except for the addition of
marginal labels to aid
the reader in the identification of specific
scales and measures.
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Directions for Decision-Making Test

the
This is a test of decision-making ability. Please write your name in
strictly
be
will
test
of
this
results
The
space provided on the answer sheet.
confidential, and used for experimental purposes only.

In front of you are three decks of cards, each deck containing 50 cards.
Each deck definitely contains circles, and may have in addition a certain number
These are the only kinds of cards which the deck may have. The deck
pf ssuares.
You will
is wall shuffled and the cards are not placed in any kind of order.
can be
There
deck.
entire
hcvi to decide how many circles there are in the
One of these
deck.
the
either 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, or 50 circles in
one
deck
the
through
ten possibilities is the correct answer. You will flip
to
you
to
up
is
It
ctrd at a time. You will be allowed only a single decision
make
can
You
reached.
decide when the best time to make your, decision has been
will
ycur decision at any point as you flip through the cards. Your performance
correct
for
a
points
You will receive more
be evaluated by a scoring system.
In other words, the sooner you
the series.
in
earlier
it
make
you
decision if
correct. However,
make your decision, the more points you will receive if it is
Incorrect. Obviously, the
you will receive zero points if the decision you make is
make the correct demore cards you look at the better chance you will have to
lower the
On the other hand, the longer you delay your decision the
cision.
that
important
It is
of points you will receive for a correct decision.
.

number
you try to score as many points as possible.

card is presented
There Is a second part of the experiment. Before each
the 10 point confidence
to you. you should check the appropriate position of
of your decision
correctness
the
confidence
This should represent your
scale.
shown to you. Be sure to check
if you had to make it before the next card Is
Remember, you are allowed only
time.
all fifty of these scales at the appropriate
decision has
When you feel that the best time to make your
a single decision
coming trial.
the
for
.cale
confidence
arrived write your decision next to the
is shown
card
25th
the
after
For example, if you wish to make your decision
any question
ask
to
free
Feel
scale.
to you, luce your answer next to the 26th
you may have about these instructions.

m

.
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Name

Male

Female

DECISION-MAKING TEST
Deck
1

2
3

4
5
6
7

8

9

10
11.

12
13

14
15
16
17

18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

34
35
36
37

38
39

40
41
42
43
44

45
46
47
48
49
50

123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456739 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
23456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456709 10
1234 6789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
12 3 456789 10
123456789 10
123456 789 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
1

5.

Deck

1

1
2

3

4
5

6
7

8
c

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
10
19
20
21
22
23

24
25
26
27

28
29

30
31
32
33
34

35
36
37

38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Deck

2

123456789 10
123456789 10
123456709 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
12 3456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456709 10
123456789 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456 09 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456739 10
123456789 10
123456709 10
123456789 10
123456709 10
123456739 10
3 9 10
3 4 5'6
123456789 10
123456739 10
123456789 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
7

1

2

7

•

1

2
3

4
5

6
7

8
9

10
11
12
13

14
15
16
17

10
19

20
21
22
23

24
25
26
27

28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

40
41
42
43

44
45
46
47

40
49
50

3

123456709 10
123456789 10
123456709 10
123456739 10
123456739 10
123456789 10
123456709 10
12 3456709 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
0 9 10
6
3 4
123456789 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456709 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456789 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456789 10
123456709 10
123456789 10
123456709 10
123456709 10
123456739 10
123456739 10
123456709 10
123456789 10
123456789 10
1

2

5

7
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Next, we have a slightly different set of decisions for you to make.

Sometimes when there is a decision to be made we prefer
Instructions
But on other occasions we prefer to have it
to make it ourselves.
made by someone else or by a group or committee.
;

On the following pages you are asked to imagine yourself in a
series of situations, and to indicate how you would feel about making
certain decisions. There are no right or wrong answers— the best
answer is the one that indicates how you think you would feel about
difmaking the decisions. We suspect that different people may feel one
ferently, and that people who prefer to decide for themselves insituation may feel quite differently in another situation.

After each situation has been described you will find a seven-step
scale that looks like this:

Definitely
prefer to
decide
myself

:

•

*•

•

:

:

Definitely
prefer
someone else
decide

how you
Please put a checkmark in a space on the scale to indicateIf you feel
would feel about the situation that has been described.
yourself, or that
very sure that you would prefer to make the decisionshould put Y^ur
you
you would prefer to have someone else make it,
very unsure, you should
are
you
If
spaces.
end
chedOTark in one of the
sure but are leaning one way or
chedTSe m?ddle space. If ySu aren't in-between
spaces.
the other, you should check one of the

students living in a
You are a floor counselor for a group of 35
they don't want to live
dormitory. Two roommates come to you and say
They want you
room.
toSSther Anymore, but each wants to remain in the you would like to
which one
to decide which one will move. You know
the students they must
have move. WUl you decide, or will you tell
decide for themselves?

Definitely
decide
myself

;

•

»

;

;

^*Hh«
decide

:

Reduced financial
You are an administrator in a small college.
faculty
.
support makes it necessary to discharge one
candidates, but has
to two "^^f^;.
down
field
the
soSel Committee has narrowed
You can either pick the person who
fche final decision to you.
decision. Which
Hit be d^tcharged, or ask the Committee to make that
will you do?

Definitely
ask Committee
to decide

S^^^^li^^^^
decide
:.

:

:

:

•

•

"^Y^^^^
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Your daughter is getting married. She has 7 very close friends.
Only 6 can participate in the wedding. She asks you to help her choose
which one vdll be left out. You don't really care much for one of her
close friends, and your daughter knows this. Will you decide which
one is to be left out, or will you tell your daughter she will have to
decidet

Definitely
tell her to
decide

Definitely
decide
myself

You are a guidance counselor at a high school. A student you have
counseled was arrested for assaulting someone inside the school building, and has served some time in the local juvenile detention center.
On the recommendation of the probation officer he has now been releasedf
and a decision must be made as to whether or not he shall be permitted
to return to school. Will you make the decision or ask the probation
officer to make it?
Definitely ask
probation
officer to decide

:

:

:

:

:

:

Definitely
decide
myself

You have gone shopping for furniture. Your spouse was supposed
There are two couches on sale
to meet you, but something came up.
which your spouse would presure
you
aren't
but
you,
to
that appeal
or both of them may be sold.
one
day
next
the
until
If you wait
fer.
that your spouse can get
chance
take
a
you
will
Will you decide, or
down town tomorrow and decide?

Definitely
decide
myself

:

:

J«

:

:

Definitely
let spouse
decide

J

You are a teacher in a high school. Two students have applied
to be foreign exchange students the following year, but only one can
be accepted. You have the responsibility for making the final decision, but are only moderately well acquainted with the two students.
Will you make the decision, or ask other teachers to make it?

Definitely ask
others to
decide

;

:

:

:

i

?

Definitely
decide
myself

You are an M.D. whose patient has an unusual, but not very seriThere are two known treatments for the problem, and each
ous, malady.
establishes a lifelong allergy which prevents the subsequent use of
chance
the other. Medical records indicate that each has about a 90%
two
the
of
which
yourself
for
of curing the problem. Will you decide
decide?
to
consultants
of
treatments to use, or will you ask a board
Definitely
decide
myself

:

:

:

-

•

Definitely
consultants to
decide
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You are a student in a human relations course. One of the course
requirements Involves pairing off with one other member of the class
for several meetings in which you will be required to discuss your personal problems. You are scheduled to be paired with either of two other
personSf one of whom seems to have a terrible personality and the other
of whom seems to have a rather unattractive personality. You can either
choose one of the two as your discussion partner, or let the teacher
choose one. Which will you do?

Definitely
let teacher
decide

:

:

:

:

:

Definitely
decide
myself

:

You are the Assistant Scout Leader, and have been instructed not
to raaJce any major policy decisions without first consulting the Section
Chief. While on a camping trip with a group of Scouts you are contact-*
ed by a newspaper reporter who wants to do a pictorial story of the
camping experience. You suspect that the Section Chief would not object, but aren't sure. Will you make the decision, or insist that he
drive back to town and ask the Section Chief?

Definitely
decide
myself

;

:

:

:

:

Definitely
let Section Chief
decide

:

You are a marine biologist who has developed a new breed of fish
that grows very rapidly and is likely to multiply more rapidly than
any other species. As a source of meat it might prove a boon for mankind, but there is also a danger that it might upset the ecology and
cause almost all other marine life to perish. You have located a landlocked pond where, In 10 years, you can determine whether it is a boon
or a curse, and only a few immediate neighbors can possibly be harmed
by your experiment. Will you decide for yourself whether to proceed
with the test, or ask a board of marine specialists to decide for you?

Definitely
ask others
to decide

:

:

:

:

:

'

Definitely
decide
myself
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Self Appraisal Questionnaire

now we
You have completed the first part of the experiment, andanswer the
Please
information.
"background"
would like to gather some
following questions:
Sex

Age

Name

M_F

Class

— P^°"®

Campus address_
^Protestant

Religious preference: Catholic

^Jewish

^Other

None

Grade point average_

Major department at U-Mass

Scores were?
Do you remember what your College Board

Verbal.

Math

If so, what?_

Do you participate in athletic activities?

What are your extracurricular activities?.
How well would you say you are doing in college?
on the following scales)
1

4

3

2

(please rate yourself

S

P°°^

extremely well

Are you pleased with your social life?
^

extremely pleased

quite dispieasea

in school and other i^P^J^";^^^^;^?
Do you find that you are interested
you generally bored or disinterested^
vities in your present life, or are

_3

2

4

extremely interested

5

^ored

to do with your life at the present
Are you doing what you really want
time?
-

2

^4 ti.^^.,
definitely
^

xr:.T.*~^."?
etc.)?
treem fatigue,

Ves

"

3

L

5

not at all

No

psychocontemplate, seeking guidance or
Have you ever, or do you now
No
logical help here at U-Mass? Yes
Next, we would like to ask y-/?::o?hlli'c°arsi:iatfons? "p^easf"t?y'
that your
?r^^tf%fcS^atr:Ad^h-eft fs

XSret"nd1U.er
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S»lf ApTa:ai»al of D«ci«iv«M8«

answers are strictly confidential * and will be used only for statistical
purposes.

Each of the following questions can be answered by circling the appropriate number on the 7-point scale which follows each question. Simply
note on the scale how true you feel this statement is as a description
of you.
1.

I feel it is easy for me to make most decisions.
1

±.

3

2

I often get anxious when I have to make decisions.
1

4

3

2

very true

It takes me a very long time to reach a decision.
1

2

not true at all
4.

7

6

5

somewhat true

not true at all
3.

very true

somewhat true

not tru^'at all
2.

7

6

5

3
'

7

6

5

4

very true

somewhat true

After I reach a decision, I'm never sure it was the right one.
1

2

3

not true at all

4

7

6

5

somewhat true

'

very true

^

of cereal
Small decisions (such as what clothes to wear, what brand
big
really
than
me
for
difficult
to buy, what movie to see) are more
ones*
5.

1

2

3

3

2

very true

4

7

6

5

very true

somewhat true

not true at all

^

Compared to most of my friends, I am a very decisive person.
1

noi

7

6

Big decisions are more difficult for me than small ones.
i

7.

5

somewhat true

not true at all
6.

4

2

fc

3
'

'

rue a^ all

4

somewhat true

6

5
'

7

very true

difficult and
Please describe some of the decisions which you find most
most eag:^.^^
Most Easy decision?
difficult decisions.

•

Ill

Self Appraisal Questionnaire - Part

2,

Instructions ; Please answer the following questions, trying to be
as honest to your true feelings as possible. All responses are strictly
confidential.

Taking all things together, how would you say things are these days
you say you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy these
days?
1.

— would

Very happ y

Pretty happ y

Not too happ y

In general, how satisfying do you find the way you are spending your
life these days? Would you call it completely satisfying, pretty satisfying, or not very satisfying?
2.

Completel y

Not very satisfyin g

Pretty satisfyin g

—

The following questions are more specific you should check in the appro
prlate space whether the statement is almost always true of you, often
true , sometimes true , seldom true , or never true , (at. ot. stt. sdt, nt)
at
3.
4.
5*
6.
7.

8.
9.

10.
!!•
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

23.
24.
25.

I generally feel in pretty good spirits.
I am very satisfied with life.
I find a good deal of happiness in life.
I feel that I am a person of worth, at
least on an equal plane with others.
I feel that I have a number of good
qualities.
I am able to do things as well as most
other people.
I feel I do not have too much to be proud
of.
I take a positive attitude toward myself.
Sometimes I think I am no good at all.
I am a useful guy to have around.
I feel that I can't do anything right.
When I do a job, I do it well.
I feel that my life is not very useful.
I feel that nobody wants me.
I feel lonesome.
These days my parents really help out;
they don't let me down.
I feel loved.
No one cares what happens, when you get
right down to it.
The life of the average man is getting
worse, not better.
People don't really care what happens to
the next fellow.
I get the feeling that life is not very

useful
These days I get the feeling that I'm just
not a part of things.
These days I don't know who I can depend
on.

ot

stt

sdt

nt
S&tiBfaetloi
in Life

SelfEsteem

Lack

oi

Social
social
Support

Anonie

(almost always true » at; often true - ot; sometimes true
true
sdt; never true « nt)
at
26.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

38.
39.

40.
41.
42.

43.

ot

stt

It is hardly fair to bring a child into
the world the way things look now.
I feel no one really cares much about
what happens to me.
...^
I feel the future looks bright.
Things seem hopeless.
I feel bored.
I feel down in the dumps.
I feel depressed.
I am bothered by noise.
I feel like smiling.
I feel happy.
I feel sad.
Although I don't show it, I am very
jealous.
I am likely to hold a grudge.
When I look back on what's happened to me,
I feel cheated.
I don't seem to get what's coming to
..1.^
me.
I feel I get a raw deal out of life.
If I let people see the way I fell, they
would think I was hard to get along
with
Other people always seem to get the
breaks.

stt;

seldom

sdt

nt

_^

_

>

Anoale

j

_

i

«^

_

.

^VreBuio

>

^»

_

——

—

^
Sadness

/

»

^ ——

—

\

ResentBen

—
«

Finally, we would like to ask you a few true-false type questions.
True

False
OteMsivaness

1.
2.

3.

.4.
5.

6.

7.

8.
9.

I have very few fears compared to my friends.
I have no dread of going into a room by myself

where other people have already gathered and
are talking.
I have no fear of water.
I am inclined to take things hard.
When I am feeling very happy and active, someone who is blue or low will spoil it all.
My plans have frequently seemed so full of
difficulties that I have had to give them all

When I am in a group of people I have trouble
thinking of the right things to talk about.
I believe I am no more nervous than others.
I should like to belong to several clubs or
lodges.

10.

11.

At times I feel that I can make up my mind
with unusually great ease.
I have had no difficulty in keeping ray balance
walking.

1
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True
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

I am not likely to speak to people until they speak
to me.
My hands have not become clumsy or awkward.
I love to go to dances.
I strongly defend my own opinions as a rule.

_«
•

I blush no more often than others.
I am not bothered by a great deal of belching of

gas from my stomach.
18.

False

-i..—

I enjoy detective or mystery stories.

You have now completed the part of this study which is done here in the
"laboratory." There are two additi onal parts of this study, one involving two friends of yours who you believe would be willing to fill
out a very short questionnaire for us, the other involving a short questionnaire which will be mailed to you in a few weeks, which you may complete at your leisure and return via campus mail. Some of you will be
contacted and asked to return for a short interview, and will earn extra
course credit for this. The reason for the part involving friends of
yours is that we need information about you which doesn't come from you,
but which a friend can accurately give us. In other words, this is sort
of an "objective" technique to see if your self -perceptions agree with
how yovir friends see you. Thus, it is important not to inform your
friend of the questionnaire or your answers to some of the questions.
Also, we will need to inform your friend that you have given permission
for him to give us some information about you. So, on the next page,
you will see two copies of this form, along with a space for you to give
your permission. We ask you to enter the name and address of a friend
on the top of each form, and to sign your name giving permission. Please
turn the page and look at these forms.

XJ.H

Kknal Self-appraisal Questionnaire
Dear

Anxiety on Exams (I-5)
Self Appraisal of
Performance (6-12)

During the past two months you have participated in a research
study of decision-making and how it relates to other behavior. VJe now
ask you to complete this final, short questionnaire, which relates to
your present feelings. When we receive this questionnaire from you, you
will be awarded your course credits for participation in this experiment.
You can return this form to me in one of two ways. Either drop it off at
my office (501 Tobin) or return it through Campus Mail (no stampe necessary).
To send it through Campus Mail, you need simply FOLD this
questionnaire so that the label with my address is showing (this will
conceal your address), staple or tape it closed, and drop it in any
CAMPUS mail box. If you would like me to send you the results of this
study, you may so indicate at the end of this questionnaire.
Thank you
very much for your help and your contribution to this research.
,

With the approach of final examinations, many students find that they
have strong feelings related to their performance, studying, etc. The
following questions relate to your feelings as you approach finals.
1.

How much time do you spend worrying or thinking about your finals
during the week of final examinations?
Most or all of the time
A good deal of the time
Occasionally
Just a little
Not at all

2.

How much anxiety or fear do you feel when you think about finals?
Try to think about finals right now . « . how much fear or anxiety
do you feel?
_________ Extremely intense anxiety or fear
Fairly intense anxiety or fear
Moderate anxiety or fear
Only slight anxiety or fear
No anxiety or fear.

3.

4.

Please describe your anxiety or fear as you are about to begin an
examination. Imagine yourself in the room, pencil in hand, final
exam face down on the desk, the teacher says "BEGIN." Your anxiety
or fear is:
Extremely intense
Fairly intense
Moderately intense
Only slight fear or anxiety
No fear or anxiety at all

How concerned or worried are you about your performance on finals?
Extremely worried
Somewhat worried
Concerned, but not worried
Not very concerned or interested
Not at all interested
'
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5.

Describe your reaction when you find that you have failed or done
poorly on an examination.
I feel as if I have failed as a person; I feel inadequate
troubled, but I am able to get over it fairly easily
"ZZZZ ^
It troubles me a little
It hardly bothers me at all
^ laugh it off, for tests don't matter anyway

^

6.

7.

8.

How well do you expect to do on finals this semester?
Excellently
Very well
________ Average
POor
Fail

How well would you like to do this semester?
_______ Excellently
_______ Very well
_______ Average
Poor
ZZZI ^ail
this
How well satisfied are you with your college experience

semester?
Extremely satisfied
_____ Very satisfied
Neutral
Somewhat dissatisfied
Very dissatisfied
.

.

9.

semester?
Has school met your needs and expectations this
Completely
Partially
well as can be expected
Not very well
Not at all
,

'

this semester, either
Have you undergone any significant "changes"
changes in values or begoid or bad? ihese\ight include experiences,
moods, sought
liefs, changes in life style and habits, extreme
psychological help, etc.?
good
I have undergone a great many changes, mostly
good
mostly
I have experienced some changes,
I have experienced no changes, good or bad
for the Daa.
I have experienced some changes, mostly
the bad
for
all
I have undergone a lot of changes,
10

~~

Please describe some of these changes, if

any_

and in life as you
Do you see yourself as progressing in school
and desire?
plan
^
^
- t ..•,4. ^-K^m
them to.
^
Definitely, things are going just as I want
to.
thiln
want
I
as
Things are generally going
Neutral
i.^
i.w
^
Things are not really going just as I want them to.
11.

"~~
.
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12,

Finally» please describe, in your own words, how you see your ability
to make decisions (are you a good decision maker? why? how? etc.),
and then how you believe your ability to make decisions (tMr. lack of
ability) helps, hurts, or otherwise affects your life. Also, please
mention how you feel you became the kind of decision-maker you now
are (parents, school, personal experiences, etc.).

research.
Again, thank you very much for your help in this

Michael S. Weissman
Department of Psychology
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Massachusetts 01002

Pttor
Ptter

Rating of D*ciftlv«n«Bs (l-7)
Rating of Psrforaanc* (8-12)

Peer-rating. Questionnaire
To:

who is par«
Your name was given to us by
to
trying
We
are
decision-making.
on
study
ticipating in a psychology
how
this
and
decisions,
make
people
how
about
learn as much as possible
relates to their other behavior at college. As you can see in the next
paragraph, your friend has given us permission to send this questionnaire
to you. Your friend will NOT see your responses, and all information
will be strictly confidential. The idea is that we need some objective
information about our subjects from the point of view of other people
who know them. Here is your friend's permission to give us this information.
J T w
I am a participating in this study of decision-making, and I hereby give my permission for you to answer the questions in this questionnaire, which I have seen. Thank you.
Now, we would like you to answer the following questions by checking
the appropriate number on the 7-point scale which follows each question.
That is, if you think the statement is "not true at all" of your friend,
then you would circle number 1, if it is just a little true, circle number
Don't forget,
true.
2, etc., up to number 7, which means it is always
and he or
friend,
your
of
is
statement
this
true
how
you are to estimate
she will NOT see your answers.
1.

I feel that it is easy for
1

2

3

5

6
.

very true

My friend often gets anxious when she/he has to make decisions.
1

2

3

not true at all
3.

4

somewhat true

not true at all
2.

my friend to make most decisions.

±^
somewhat true

5

6^

7

very true

It takes my friend a very long time to reach a decision.
1

2

3

4

somewhat true

not true at all

5

6

2

very true

"

the
After my friend reaches a cecision, she/he is never sure it was
right one.
4.

1

not true at all

2

3

4

5

6

7

very true

somewhat true

of cereal
Small decisions (such as what clothes to wear, what brand
than really
to buy, which movie to see) are more difficult for my friend
big ones.
5.

6

7
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5.

Big decisions are mors difficult for my friend than small ones.
1

2

3_

7.

4

5

7

6

somewhat true

not true at all

.

very true

Compared to most of my friends, this friend is a very decisive person,
2

1

3

4

7

6

5

very true

somewhat true

not true at all

Finally, we would like to ask you a few general questions about your
friend,
8.

How well would you say your friend is doing in college?
1

2_

3

very poorly

extremely well
9.

How would you rate your friend's social life?
1

2

3

very poor

How well do you think your friend will do in life?
1

2

3

4

L-

very poorly

extremely well
11.

5

4.

excellent
10 «

5

^4

How would you say your friend reacts to stress or problems?
1

extremely well

2

3

4

5

very poorly

Would you say that your friend is interested in school and other
activities in his present life, or would you say that she/he is generally bored or disinterested?

12.

extremely well

very poorly

After you complete this questionnaire, please mail it to me by simply
FOLDING it up so that the little label with my address on it is showing,
staple or tape it closed, and drop it in any CAMPUS mail box. If you
live off campus, a stamp is already attached, so drop it into any regular
mail boxo Note that by folding it this way, you conceal your name and
address, and leave mine showing. It is important to do this properly,
of course.
Thank you very much for your help in this research. If you are interestboted in obtaining the results of this research, either note that on the
happy
very
be
will
I
Spring.
tom of this form, or write to me during the
to send you a summary of all our findings. Again, thank you.
.

Michael Weissman
Department of Psychology
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Massachusetts 01002

'
,
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W-Titten Feedback to Subiectd

^^^^ completed your participation in
experiment
wou^'h^ilike ^^.r"
I would
to personally thank you, and exolain in a this
t I^S^f S Z

exactly what the purpose

this

n

Sp^rSJenHslSd'hoS the"ttr"l?'bf

purpose Of this experiment is straightforward
"ably already aware of what we are looking
fol.
EwStl
°^ decision-makings we are trying to learn
^^.^

,nH

J*'S,'''^f°

?S?lv

tM=

it:^' t^i

"P«='^ °^ dlcision-making, Ind (2?"Sw ?Se
d^c?!iS^!;i!^v^'
decision-making *5:fjr^°"=
ability of individuals relates to their abilitv
to
with stress and adjust to the normal pressures
of liSr It is mv cSS''
^fcisive. thit is, thise who'a^I I^Slly
^!e'?S ^nSL^"?i^J^*^"
?
decision-maicing
process , will cope better with
*=°P^"? behavior is indicated by l^e Sjoctlve
iidfcftn^^'S?JecL^ indicators
of performance (academic performance, social inter^^^""^ "pS;oral=i?y m«^res"
^seif-este«n, alienation, tendency to depression,
(set?-lit:™^'a?fei:?l""'*/^^^'
etc.).
measures
of
decisiveness
were obtained from
vnn.
ttl li^'^l l' f^Y!^*}
(deciding the ratio of squares to circles by lookina
^f?^
^^P^®
number) was aimed at learning how
mn^H 4
decision. The Sxt two
?nsSriSfnfS^«iv"H^'''' to give us information
about
your tendency to defer
d2rir?2n«^«
to others and how much risk you are willing to
tolerate in a
h!^?!^^®
^®
direct
questions
aboit
how
?'
you evaluate
^oni iiJ*^
.
f?'^®^
decision-making
ability. Taken together, these instruments pre««nt
your decision-making style. After these measures
were o2ta?nL^ SnJ!''^^?^
questionnaires related to the
r«nfn« behavior
nfi?,!?'
coping
mentioned above, and at the end of the semester, you completed an anxiety questionnaire related to final examinations
ind some of
,
you were interviewed. Also, we received some information
from two friends
picture or
of your
LY?^^^Lto cope with daily9ave us. These data give us a P^cx:ure
ability
life and its stresses.
Our job, of course, is to make sense of all this data. We
are looking for two things in this data:
(1) whether the various measures of de^^^^ ^aSh other, and (2) how each of the measures
^o2i^?!!SS2
"^fJ^i?*^®"*
correlated with
the measures of psychological adjustment and coping. In
hope to learn more about the nature of decisiveness—
t.WHir?4-*^f®®' "^f
^""^^^
several aspects, or whether each of the
^^t,t^t
^f.^
^i"^^®
must be seen as an independent phenomenon, for example.
f"®"^
L^"""^!:
^^^^^ aspects Of decisiveness is most im^f?^^?'' to it^^^.^^
nor^int relative
portant,
the others.
In the second case, we want to see if
<=^ar act eristic of individuals, accounts for some
of
^^ir^^^I ^^x.?
°^
adjustment
and
coping
shown
by
these
indiviHofi^
decisive helps indi^®*^"
vidifL cope wffv,''???^'
viduais
with life and rf"^
its stresses.
cannot supply you with your individual scores on the
validity of the measures is one of the things
w^wMn^^o^^«Aw^S''^''^^^^
out and any single score is misleading and subject to a
^
nnmi^!2
however, any subject in this experiment who
fri^H
u^''®*'®^^''"^would like 2
to have
a summary of the overall findings of this study may
have one by either leaving your name with me now (I will
mall the sura^^^^ semester) or by stopping by my office next semester
(501

f

t

T

Snf

TobinT?"

^^^^^
y°^^ participation in this study,
and for contributing to my exploration of decisiveness.

Michael S. Welssman

